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On December 14, 2005, 25-
year-old Laval Police 
Constable Valerie Gignac 
was shot and killed after 
responding to a call at an 
apartment building about an 
extremely agitated and 
aggressive person. When she knocked at the 
suspect's door, Constable Gignac was shot once 
through the closed door by a 
male suspect armed with a 
high-calibre rifle. After being 
shot, her partner 
administered CPR on her until 
paramedics arrived. She was 
transported to hospital where 
she succumbed to her injury.  
 
The suspect barricaded himself in the 
apartment, resulting in an armed stand-off with 
police SWAT teams from both the Laval Police 
Service and the Quebec Provincial Police. The 
suspect was known to police and they had 
responded to his apartment before. After hours 
of negotiation, he surrendered to police with no 
further incident. 
 
Constable Gignac had served with the Laval 
Police Department for 4 years 
and had previously served with 
the Police de Repentigny for 8 
months. She is survived by her 
husband, also a Laval 
constable in the K-9 section. 
 
The preceding information was provided with the 
permission of the Officer Down Memorial Page: 
available at www.odmp.org/Canada 
 
‘IN SERVICE: 10-8’  
NOW IN 6th YEAR 
 
The Police Academy’s 
“Peer Read Publication” 
has entered its sixth year 
of printing. Back issues 
are available from 2001, 
2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and now 2006 on the 
Police Academy website at www.jibc.bc.ca.  
 
From the inaugural issue it was clear that this 
newsletter was not about glossy paper, fancy 
pictures, or sleek advertising. Rather, it was just 
a plain, black letter publication keeping the front 
line officer current with issues facing them on 
the street. Readers were told to feel free to 
copy the newsletter and pass it on to colleagues. 
From our tremendous e-mail response, we know 
this has happened.  
 
Police officers make decisions every day 
requiring careful and prudent deliberation that 
will impact people’s lives, in some cases forever. 
Errors can be costly. When the cops screw up, 
cases, careers, and even lives can be at stake. 
“There is an old saying, ‘Doctors bury their 
mistakes while lawyers send theirs to prison’. 
Police officers do a little of both”1. 
 
This is one reason why the “In Service: 10-8” 
newsletter was created. It is a quick way to stay 
on top of the game. Of course, it is not the end-
all-be-all. It is simply one method of bringing 
that golden legal nugget from the courtroom to 
where it counts, the street.  Be smart and stay 
safe!!! 
                                                 
1 Holden, R. (1986). Modern Police Management. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Simon & 
Scuster, Inc. at p.243. 
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 ‘IN SERVICE: 10-8’ 
e-LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 
 
“I might only be repeating 
what others told you many 
times over.  However; here it 
is once more.  Your 
publication should be 
mandatory reading for all serving police officers 
in BC”—Police Officer, British Columbia 
************ 
“Thank you for making such a great resource 
available to agencies in the field”—Master 
Corporal, Military Police 
************ 
“Can you load me onto your e-mailing list for the 
publication?  It's well put together and you 
always seem to have a handle on the "cut 
through the crap" angle of things”—Police 
Constable, British Columbia 
************ 
“Please add me to your distribution file for the 
10-8 newsletter because I find it so palatable 
and can use it to create learning activities for 
my police recruit students”—Recruit Training 
Unit, Alberta 
************ 
“I was just put onto [In Service:10-8] by a co-
worker and I can see it being a useful tool in 
staying on top of things”—Police Constable, 
RCMP British Columbia 
************ 
“The articles are excellent tools for any police 
officer to stay up to date on current legislation.  
I appreciate the quality of your work and look 
forward to future readings”—Police Constable, 
Alberta 
************ 
“I have never seen this publication before and I 
noted several very informative cases and would 
ask that you place me on your electronic 
distribution list so that I can share Service 10-8 
with the other members of our unit”—Police 
Corporal, RCMP British Columbia  
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‘IN SERVICE’ LEGAL ROAD      
TEST  
 
The “In Service” Legal 
Road Test is a simple 
multiple choice quiz 
designed to challenge 
your understanding of the law. Each question is 
based on a case featured in this issue. See page 
37 for the answers. 
 
1. Firearm ownership in Canada is… 
(a) a constitutional right 
(b) a privilege 
 
2. When searching as an incident to lawful arrest 
the police need not consider exigent 
circumstances (ie. whether or not obtaining a 




3. When a police officer relies on a roadside 
breath test “fail” result for reasonable 
grounds the Crown must prove the testing 
apparatus was an approved screening device 




4. A protective pat down search by police 
incident to an investigative detention is an 
automatic power without the need for a 




5. A pocket search at the border by Customs 
officers is part of the routine screening 







Courage is fear that has said its prayers—
Dorothy Bernard 
TWO COMMUNICATIONS 
SUFFICIENT TO MEET 
‘REPEATEDLY’ REQUIREMENT 
R. v. Ohenhen,  
(2005) Docket:C41405 (OntCA) 
 
The accused was arrested and 
sentenced to 30 days in jail and 
three years probation after 
persistently calling the victim 
and eventually threatening to rape and kill her 
and bomb her house and family. Shortly after 
the trial the victim received a card from the 
accused stating, “I hope you had a Merry 
Christmas.” She threw it away and moved on with 
her life. About nine years later the victim 
received a letter from the accused with a hand 
written heart on it stating, “Get back to me.” 
The letter had a return address from a mental 
institution and the victim felt threatened by it. 
She contacted the police and the letter was 
copied and mailed back to the institution marked 
“return to sender.” 
 
Eighteen months later the victim received 
another upsetting letter from the accused that 
was post marked from Toronto. This letter 
scared the victim. The victim called police and 
the accused was charged with uttering threats 
under s.264.1 and criminal harassment under 
s.264(2)(b), both Criminal Code offences. He was 
acquitted of the threatening charge, but 
convicted of criminal harassment by a judge and 
jury.  
 
The accused appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing his conduct in sending two letters 
over 18 months did not amount to “repeatedly 
communicating”, as required by s.264(2)(b). The 
accused’s argument was mainly based on a British 
Columbia Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Ryback 
(1996) where a judge stated, “Three 
communications would seem to be the minimum 
number sufficient to justify being described as 
‘repeatedly’”.  
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Justice MacFarland authoring the unanimous 
judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal, 
however, disagreed with the accused. She 
stated: 
 
In my view, the dictionary definitions of the 
words “repeat” and “repeated”, from which the 
adverbial form “repeatedly” is derived, lead me 
to conclude that conduct which occurs more 
than once can, depending on the circumstances 
of the case, constitute “repeated” conduct or 
conduct which is “repeatedly” done and the 
section is met. In my view, it is unnecessary 
that there be a minimum of three events or 
communications. “Repeatedly” obviously means 
more than once but not necessarily more than 
twice. 
 
While one instance of unwanted conduct can 
be sufficient to satisfy s. 264(2)(c) and (d), it 
will not be sufficient to satisfy s. 264(2)(b). 
More than one instance of unwanted conduct 
will be necessary to meet paragraph (b); 
however, in my view, there is not and should 
not be any minimum number of instances of 
unwanted conduct beyond this to trigger these 
subsections. Provided the conduct occurs more 
than once, in my view, the actus reus can be 
made out. It will be a question of fact for the 
trier in each case whether there has been 
repeated conduct. The approach is a 
contextual one. The trier will consider the 
conduct that is the subject of the charge 
against the background of the relationship 
and/or history between the complainant and 
accused. It is in this context that a 
determination will be made as to whether 
there has been repeated communication. On 
the facts of this case, it was clear that 
neither of the communications could be 
characterized as innocuous or accidental. In 
the context in which they were made, these 
two communications would be sufficient to 
constitute “repeatedly” communicating as set 
out in s. 264(2)(b). In my view, it was entirely 
appropriate for the trial judge to use the 
standard charge language on this point. [paras. 
31-32] 
 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
REASONABLE & PROBABLE 
GROUNDS MORE THAN 
SUSPICIONS 
R. v. Legere, 2005 NBCA 100 
 
The accused was involved in an 
accident for no apparent reason 
and had an odour of alcohol on 
his breath. There were five 
others in the vehicle and alcohol was found 
outside it. The officer had a suspicion the 
accused had been drinking and was impaired 
while driving. He was also told by one of the 
passengers that all the occupants had been 
drinking. At the hospital the officer read the 
blood demand and blood samples were taken. 
 
At trial in New Brunswick Provincial Court on 
charges of impaired driving causing death and 
dangerous driving causing death the trial judge 
concluded the officer did not have reasonable 
and probable grounds to justify the blood 
demand because he only had enough to support a 
suspicion. The trial judge stated: 
 
[The police officer] testified that he 
concluded that the driver may have been 
drinking, may have been impaired while 
driving, and that he had to look further into 
it. And as I said earlier, it – it is a suspicion, 
yes, a reasonable one, that they were drinking 
and he was driving. Then he testified that 
…he read the blood demand since he believed 
he had enough grounds. This is not to say that 
the officer must state his conclusions in 
every case. For instance, where the signs of 
impairment are overwhelming. This was far 
from being the case here. You have an 
accident which could be attributed to driver 
inexperience, distraction, speed, as much as 
the consumption of alcohol factor. The 
accused in no way was behaving like a person 
under the influence of alcohol. I would even 
go so far as to say that it looked the 
opposite. Then you have an officer testifying 
about suspicions where there – the available 
information that the officer had and the 
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observation that he made only appear to 
support suspicions…  
 
Since the blood demand was unlawful, the 
collection of the samples violated the accused’s 
rights under s.8 of the Charter. The results of 
the tests were then excluded under s.24(2). The 
Crown then appealed to the New Brunswick Court 
of Appeal arguing the trial judge used the wrong 
analysis in deciding whether the officer had the 
requisite belief to make the demand.  
 
Justice Deschenes, writing the judgment of the 
court, dismissed the appeal. The Crown bears the 
burden of proving that the officer had the 
necessary grounds to make the demand. 
Reasonable and probable grounds requires an 
officer hold a subjective belief in their mind and 
the grounds must be objectively justified—a 
reasonable person standing in the shoes of the 
officer would conclude there were reasonable 
and probable grounds. If the Crown cannot prove 
the necessary grounds, the demand is 
unauthorized and unlawful. The Court of Appeal 
concluded the trial judge made no error in 
coming to his conclusion. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
ROADSIDE TEST MUST BE 
GIVEN FORTHWITH: FIVE 
MINUTE DELAY TOO LONG 
R. v. McConville, 2005 BCPC 488 
 
The accused was stopped for 
traffic infractions and the 
officer formed a reasonable 
suspicion she had alcohol in her 
body. There was a faint odour 
of alcohol on her breath, her eyes were 
bloodshot and glassy, and there was some 
discussion about her consuming alcohol earlier. 
The officer waited five minutes to ensure there 
was no mouth alcohol present even though he had 
no reason to believe there was any. During a voir 
dire in British Columbia Provincial Court, Judge 
Moss ruled that the officer violated the 
accused’s Charter rights. He stated: 
 
If you look at the case authority, his obligation 
is to not delay the taking of breath samples 
into the approved screening device.  I do not 
see any mala fides on his part.  He seemed to 
think he was doing the accused a favour.  
 
One has to remember that the police have the 
accused in their care and under their 
detention in order to obtain the roadside 
breath sample, thereby limiting Charter 
rights.  Section (1) provides for this to take 
place.  If there is no reason to wait the five 
minutes, then, in my view, his obligation is to 
forthwith obtain the test.  Clearly, he could 
have done so.  He chose to wait the five 
minutes, thereby, in my view, taking him 
outside of the realm of reasonableness for 
obtaining the breath sample into his approved 




I am of the view he did not commit simply a 
technical breach but rather, a fundamental 
breach in waiting the five minutes.  He had an 
incorrect, or a misunderstanding of his 
obligations.  I feel sorry for the officers when 
they get faced with this sort of a conundrum, 
but I cannot find that on the facts of this 
case he had any right to wait the five minutes 
to take the sample and to talk to the 
accused. She was being detained roadside.  His 
obligation was to provide her with her Charter 
rights, and waiting for five minutes here, in my 
view, is far too long, with no reason. [para. 11] 
 
The evidence was excluded under s.24(2) of the 
Charter.  
 




When we long for life without difficulties, 
remind us that oaks grow strong in contrary 
winds and diamonds are made under pressure—
Peter Marshall 
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ON-DUTY DEATHS RISE 
 
On-duty peace officer 
deaths in Canada rose 
by four last year. In 
2005, 11 peace officers 
lost their lives on the 
job. This matches the 
10-year highs of 11 
deaths in 1997 and 
2002.   
 
Over the last 10 years motor vehicles, not guns, 
posed the greatest risk to officers. Since 1996, 
35 officers have lost their lives in circumstances 
involving vehicles, including automobile and 
motorcycle accidents (24), vehicular assault (2), 
and being struck by a vehicle (9). These deaths 
account for nearly 44% of all on-duty deaths, 
which is more than twice the next leading causes 
of gunfire (14) and aircraft accidents (12). On 
average, eight officers each year lost their lives 
during the last decade, while 1996, 1998, 1999, 
and 2003 had the least deaths at six per year.  
 
2005 Roll of Honour 
 
Constable Anthony Gordon 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police, CAN 
End of Watch: March 3, 2005 
Cause of Death: Gunfire 
 
Constable Lionide Johnston 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police, CAN 
End of Watch: March 3, 2005 
Cause of Death: Gunfire 
 
Constable Brock Myrol 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police, CAN 
EOW: Thursday, March 3, 2005 
Cause of Death: Gunfire 
 
Constable Peter Schiemann 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police, CAN 
End of Watch: March 3, 2005 
Cause of Death: Gunfire 
 
Constable J.M.J. (Jean) Minguy 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police, CAN 
End of Watch: June 3, 2005 
Cause of Death: Drowned 
 
Constable Jose Agostinho 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police, CAN 
End of Watch: July 4, 2005 
Cause of Death: Automobile accident 
 
Constable Andrew Potts 
Ontario Provincial Police, ON 
End of Watch: July 20, 2005 
Cause of Death: Automobile accident 
 
Constable Daniel Rathonyi 
Niagara Regional Police Service, ON 
End of Watch: September 15, 2005 
Cause of Death: Heart attack 
 
Wildlife Protection Officer Nicolas Rochette 
Ministère des Ressources Nature, QC 
End of Watch: November 5, 2005 
Cause of Death: Aircraft accident 
 
Wildlife Protection Officer Fernand Vachon 
Ministère des Ressources Nature, QC 
End of Watch: November 5, 2005 
Cause of Death: Aircraft accident 
 
Constable Valérie Gignac 
Police de Laval, QC 
End of Watch: December 14, 2005 
Cause of Death: Gunfire 
 
“They are our heroes. 
We shall not forget them.”2 
 
During 2005, the U.S. lost 150 peace officers. In 
the U.S. the top cause of death was gunfire (59) 
— including accidents — followed by automobile 
accident (32), heart attack (15), and vehicular 
assault (14).  The state of California lost the 
most officers (18), followed by Texas (13). 
                                                 
2 Inscription on Canadian Police and Peace Officer Memorial—Parliament Buildings 
Ottawa, Ontario. 
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NO REALISTIC OPPORTUNITY 
TO CONSULT LAWYER: RSD 
DELAY OK 
R. v. Singh,  
(2005) Docket:C43677 (OntCA) 
 
A police officer made a demand 
for the accused to provide a 
breath sample into a roadside 
screening device (RSD). The 
officer did not have an RSD with him and had to 
detain the accused for 10 minutes while he 
waited for one to arrive. At trial in the Ontario 
Court of Justice the judge found there was not a 
realistic opportunity for the accused to consult 
counsel before the RSD arrived. The judge made 
this finding because it was late at night, the 
officer had a reasonable belief the RSD would 
arrive in 5-10 minutes, the fact an RSD did 
arrive in 10 minutes, and the offering of the test 
without further delay once it was operable. The 
judge, however, did not determine whether the 
accused had a cell phone in his possession 
 
The accused appealed to the Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice where the findings of the trial 
judge were overturned. In the Superior Court 
Justice’s view, the accused had a cell phone with 
him and the officer did not know when the RSD 
would arrive when she made the demand. The 
Crown then appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing that the appeal court judge 
erred.  
 
The Ontario Court of Appeal agreed with the 
Crown and the accused’s conviction was restored. 
The trial judge’s ruling that there was no 
realistic opportunity to speak with a lawyer was 
justified. The delay was not unknown and “the 
officer reasonably anticipated a five to ten 
minute delay.” Furthermore, the trial judge made 
no finding whether the accused had a cell phone. 
The Superior Court Justice was not entitled to 
substitute his opinion for that of the trial judge.  
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
Canadian Peace Officer On Duty Deaths (by year) 
Cause 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 Total 
Aircraft accident 2  2  1 2 1  4  12 
Assault  1         1 
Auto accident 2 1 3 5 2 1 1 2 2 2 21 
Drowned 1    1   1 1 1 5 
Fall      1     1 
Gunfire 5 1  1 2    3 2 14 
Heart attack 1 2  1  1  1 1  7 
Motorcycle 
accident 
  1   2     3 
Natural disaster    1       1 
Stabbed  1      1   2 
Struck by vehicle    3  2 2 1  1 9 
Training accident     1  1    2 
Vehicular assault  1     1    2 
Total 11 7 6 11 7 9 6 6 11 6 80 
Source: Officer Down Memorial Page www.odmp.org/canada [January 02, 2006] 
US Peace Officer On Duty Deaths  
Cause 2005 
Aircraft accident 2 
Auto accident 32 
Bomb 1 
Drowned 2 
Duty Related Illness 2 
Fall 2 
Gunfire 52 
Gunfire (Accidental) 7 
Heart attack 15 
Motorcycle accident 4 
Stabbed 1 
Struck by vehicle 10 
Training accident 1 
Vehicular assault 14 
Vehicle Pursuit 5 
Total 150 
Source: Officer Down Memorial Page www.odmp.org [January 02, 2006] 
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OFFICERS MAY APPROACH 
VEHICLE ON PRIVATE 
PROPERTY TO INVESTIGATE 
R. v. Soal,  
(2005) Docket:C43184 (OntCA) 
 
A bartender called police 
reporting that she believed the 
accused was impaired and had 
recently left the bar. Police 
checked the name provided and 
attended to the accused’s address. In the 
driveway of the private residence police located 
a parked vehicle that was running with loud music 
coming from it. The officer walked up to the 
vehicle and found the accused passed out in the 
driver’s seat. She tapped on the window and 
opened the door. She  identified the accused and 
detected a strong odour of alcohol on his breath, 
noted his face was flushed and that his pupils 
were not level with his eye openings. He was 
asked to get out of the truck and was unsteady 
on his feet. He was then arrested for impaired 
operation of a motor vehicle and later failed a 
breathalyzer test. At no time did the accused 
ask police to leave the property or were there 
any signs prohibiting the public from entering. 
 
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice the 
judge convicted the accused of impaired driving, 
finding the police did not violate his s.8 Charter 
rights when they entered onto his property 
without a warrant and looked into his vehicle, 
opened his door, and asked him his name. The 
accused appealed to the Ontario Superior Court 
of Justice arguing the entry onto the private 
property and search of the vehicle were unlawful 
and unreasonable under s.8. The evidence, he 
submitted, should therefore be inadmissible 
under s.24(2).  
 
Superior Court Justice Durno accepted that 
when the officer looked into the truck and 
opened the door she was conducting a 
warrantless search, which was prima facie 
unreasonable.  The Crown, not the accused, 
therefore bore the burden of establishing the 
reasonableness of the search.  
 
Police Right to Enter Private Property 
 
After reviewing a number of authorities, Justice 
Durno concluded that in some cases the police 
are entitled at common law to enter private 
property to conduct an investigation. It was 
important to note, that in this case, it was not a 
dwelling house that was entered. Furthermore, 
the owner of a motor vehicle has a reduced 
privacy interest compared to a home. In ruling 
that the officer had the right to enter onto the 
property, Justice Durno wrote: 
 
While all of these cases can be distinguished 
on the facts, they support the conclusion that 
police can enter private property to conduct an 
investigation in some circumstances without a 
warrant.  Here, the officers had information 
that a person was driving while impaired.  They 
had a name and an address where a person by 
that name lived.  The vehicle they saw in the 
driveway was similar in description to the 
complaint received.  They knew the vehicle had 
recently left a local bar.  When they arrived, 
they saw the vehicle with the engine running 
and the radio playing loudly in a residential 
area.  The officers could not see the driver 
from the road. 
 
[Although] the officers did not see the 
[accused] drive his vehicle to that location...I 
am persuaded that the officers were acting 
within their common law authority noted above, 
having regard to the situation the officers 
faced.  They could not see the driver.  They 
had grounds to believe that the driver was 
impaired.  The engine was running.  To require 
them to obtain a warrant was unrealistic in 
that situation.  All of the foregoing was a 
sufficient basis upon which the officers could 
have a reasonable belief that the vehicle in the 
driveway was one which had been driven there 
by the person who had been cut off at the bar 
because he was impaired.  It is not essential 
that the officers had grounds to arrest the 
[accused] at the time they went on to the 
private property.  The information known to 
the officers was sufficient to give the 
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officers common-law authority to take 
investigative steps...[paras. 28-29] 
 
As for whether or not the officer violated the 
accused s.8 Charter rights by looking into the 
vehicle, opening its door, and asking the accused 
his name, Justice Druro stated: 
 
…When the officer approached the truck, she 
saw a man apparently passed out behind the 
steering wheel.  While the officer said that 
she intended to check on the man’s well being 
but did not ask him if he was all right, I am not 
persuaded that that omission defeats the 
legitimate police authority to investigate.  In 
any event, the officer wanted to determine if 
the [accused] was okay.  When she opened the 
door and made her observations, it was a 
reasonable conclusion, in the absence of any 
indication to the contrary by the [accused], 
that there was no concern for his well-being, 
although he was impaired.  It was not 
unreasonable for the officer to open the door 
to check on the [accused] and continue her 
investigation.  Once the officer made her 
observations of the [accused], it was apparent 
he was intoxicated and that she had 
reasonable and probable grounds to arrest. 
[para. 30] 
 
Furthermore, “there is a compelling public 
interest in detecting impaired drivers, and in 
preventing persons from driving while impaired.” 
With respect to asking the accused his name, 
the Superior Court concluded he was not under 
arrest or detention at the time and his rights 
were not violated. Even if his rights were 
violated, the officer’s observations and the 
breathalyser results were nonetheless 
admissible under s.24(2)3.  
 
The accused again appealed, this time to the 
Ontario Court of Appeal. The appeal court, 
however, found no error in Justice Druno’s 
reasoning and dismissed the appeal. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
                                                 
3 See R. v. Soal, (2005) Court file No.M2392/04 (OntSCJ) for facts and details 
of lower court judgments. 
ONTARIO COURT HOLDS NO 
s.10(b) REQUIRED FOR 
INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION 
R. v. Ngo, 2005 ONCJ 217 
 
Three plainclothes street crime 
unit members were patrolling a 
local billiards parlour that had 
been the location of drug, 
liquor, and weapons offences, including a 
shooting, when they saw the accused and another 
man exit and walk through a cat walk at the rear 
of the shopping plaza. The other male went to a 
parked vehicle, removed something from the 
glove box, then went to the accused where the 
two huddled together looking at the thing. The 
three officers approached on foot and 
announced “Police”, while walking up in such a way 
to separate the men from each other.  
 
The other man was arrested for having 
marihuana. When asked if he had anything on him 
that he shouldn’t, the accused replied he had a 
knife and a baton. The accused was patted down 
and a knife and baton were found. He was also 
wearing a bullet proof vest. The accused was 
searched and car keys were found on him. The 
car was also searched and police found a sword 
and machete in the trunk. The accused was then 
charged with two counts of carrying a concealed 
weapon (extendable baton and flick knife) and 
two counts of possession of a weapon for a 
dangerous purpose (sword and machete).  
 
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice the 
judge noted a number of Charter rights—such as 
s.8, s.9 and s.10—were engaged in this police 
contact and the legal issues involved when he 
stated: 
 
This seemingly simple case touches a lot of 
Charter nerves. Was it good police work - or a 
serious violation of constitutional rights? The 
resolution of this question is important 
because the type of interaction between the 
defendant and the police that occurred here 
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In first finding the accused was detained for 
the purposes of the Charter, Justice Duncan 
held: 
 
While the police officers testified that the 
[accused] was detained from the point of their 
first contact, their belief or opinion is not 
determinative of the issue, anymore than it 
would be if they held the opposite view. 
 
Police officers are entitled to approach and 
speak to anyone about anything, though there 
is no corresponding duty to answer and the 
police have no authority to detain anyone in 
the process… 
 
Detention” in a constitutional sense is not the 
same as in common parlance. Not every 
interaction between police and an individual 
that keeps the individual in the officer’s 
presence amounts to a detention. At a minimum 
there must be physical or psychological 
compulsion... 
 
In this case, it is my view that the defendant 
was detained. The investigative purpose of the 
interaction, the rapid advance, the exclaiming 
of their authority – “Police!” - the taking 
control of the defendant and separating him 
physically from [his companion], amounted to a 
detention within the meaning of sections 9 and 
(possibly) 10 of the Charter.  
 
Further, in the particular facts of this case, 
for reasons that will become apparent below, 
it is necessary to be precise as to when the 
detention occurred. I find that the process of 
detention began when the police approached 
and announced their authority, though it was 
not completed until an instant later when 
physical control of the two targets was 
affected. [paras. 13-17] 
 
However, the first stage is assessing whether 
the police are permitted to detain persons for 
investigation is whether they have reasonable 
grounds to detain (articulable cause). This 
requires a reasonable suspicion the detainee is 
criminally implicated in the activity being 
investigated. Here, Justice Duncan concluded 
there were no such grounds. He stated: 
 
In this case, it is my view that the objective 
facts up to the point of the police advance on 
the [accused] provided no reasonable basis for 
the police to suspect any criminal activity. The 
circumstances described – two young men 
going to a car, one retrieving something and 
both looking at it – are not reasonably 
suggestive of criminal activity at all. Yet it was 
these facts alone that triggered the police 
action.  
 
I was initially inclined to think that the 
concealment of the item by [the accused’s 
companion] provided an additional fact that 
may have elevated the circumstances to the 
required level of reasonably based suspicion. 
On reflection, I do not think that is so. Most 
basically, the circumstances still fall short. 
Beyond that, the decision to investigate and to 
detain for investigative purposes appears to 
have already been made at the time of the 
police approach and announcement of their 
presence. The concealment appears to me to 
have been a fortuitous occurrence that should 
not be granted pivotal significance in 
assessment of the legalities of what occurred 
thereafter. Put another way, as found above, 
the groundless detention began to take place 
an instant before the concealment. The police 
cannot rely on the target’s response to their 
actions to justify what they had already begun 
to set in motion. [paras. 19-20] 
 
Thus the detention was arbitrary and a violation 




Since the detention itself was unlawful, the 
search of the accused was unreasonable under 
these circumstances. Furthermore, the Crown 
could not demonstrate that the warrantless 
search of the car was reasonable. 
 
Right to Counsel 
 
In assessing whether the accused should have 
been advised of his Charter right to counsel, 
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Justice Duncan opined that a s.10(b) warning is 
not required for investigative detention. Citing 
the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v. 
Mann, 2004 SCC 52, which left the question of 
whether a person detained for investigation is 
entitled to be advised of their right to a lawyer 
unresolved, he wrote:  
 
It is obvious to me that the provision of the 
10(b) right to counsel – both its informational 
and operational components – is incompatible 
with investigative detention. It cannot be that 
the first thing out of the mouth of a police 
officer who lawfully stops a car or engages in a 
lawful investigatory detention on the street, is 
the multi-part informational component of the 
right to counsel. Less so, can it be that the 
detainee can exercise the right. The context 
and the need for such detentions to be brief 
militate against a right to counsel in this 
situation.  
 
Still, there is authority suggesting that at 
least the informational component of the 10(b) 
right applies even in these situations…  The 
Court’s judgment in Mann puts the continued 
vitality of the holding in Debot in some doubt. 
In any event I think Debot is distinguishable 
as a case where the police officer actually had 
grounds to arrest but deferred arrest (and 
the informing of rights to counsel) until after 
a brief search and detention. 
 
Reconciliation of the reality of investigative 
detention with the words of section 10(b) is 
not easy. But it seems to me that two 
approaches are available. First, it could be 
that “detention” under 10(b) should carry a 
different interpretation than it does under 
section 9 or even 10(a). Odd as this may seem, 
there is authority, in the leading case of R v 
Therens (1985) 18 CCC3d 481, for this 
approach. There it was held by Ledain J, 
speaking for the full Court on the point, that 
section 10(b) contemplated a different type of 
detention – less prolonged and secure - than 
did 10(c) dealing with habeas corpus.  Adopting 
this to the present case, “detention” as it 
applies to 10(b) as opposed to section 9 or 
10(a) carries the additional feature of arising 
only where the detention is such that the 
detainee might reasonably require legal advice. 
Therefore, the right to counsel of the stopped 
motorist and the individual subjected to 
investigative detention, at least without more, 
does not arise. 
 
The other approach is to view investigative 
detention as a legal rule that implicitly 
amounts to a reasonable limit on the right to 
counsel. Authority abounds for this in the 
context of roadside screening which is, in my 
view, simply a particular type of investigative 
detention… On this approach, the individual is 
“detained” within the meaning of section 10(b) 
but given the nature of the lawful police 
investigative power, he does not have a right 
to counsel. Adopting the further refinements 
of the roadside cases, he can be questioned 
and his answers may provide lawful grounds for 
further search and/or arrest, but his answers 
cannot be admitted for substantive use 
against him at trial… 
 
On either approach, there will be no violation 
of section 10(b) by failing to inform the 
detainee of his right to counsel at the stage of 
lawful investigative detention. [references 
omitted, paras. 29-33] 
 
Exclusion of Evidence 
 
Although Justice Duncan found no violation of 
the right to counsel, the evidence was excluded 
on the basis of the arbitrary detention and 
unreasonable searches. In excluding the 
evidence, he noted: 
 
The very existence of a judge-made power of 
investigative detention has caused some 
controversy and concern – even more so an 
accompanying power of search… Having 
recognized those powers, the higher Courts 
have demonstrated a trend to underline and 
enforce the limits through exclusion of 
evidence where those limits have been ignored 
or surpassed…[references omitted, para. 39] 
 




Do or not do. There is no try—Yoda 
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LAST DRINK INQUIRY NOT 
REQUIRED 
R. v. Szybunka, 2005 ABCA 422 
 
Police stopped the accused 
during the course of a Check-
Stop program after seeing him 
drive from a nightclub parking 
lot. The officer formed a suspicion the accused 
was impaired because his eyes were red and 
there was an odour of alcohol. The officer made 
an approved screening device demand and the 
accused failed. The officer then formed 
reasonable and probable grounds to believe he 
was impaired. The accused was arrested and 
read the breath demand. He subsequently 
provided samples of 160 mg% and 150mg%, both 
over the legal limit. During the tests, the 
accused told the technician he had his last drink 
5 minutes before he was stopped. 
 
At trial in Alberta Provincial Court the accused 
argued that the officer did not have reasonable 
and probable grounds for the demand because he 
did not satisfy himself that any alcohol had been 
consumed within 15 minutes of the roadside test. 
By not asking the accused if he had consumed 
alcohol within the preceding 15 minutes, it was 
contended that the officer could not rely on the 
“fail” reading to support his grounds. The trial 
judge, however, found there was no obligation on 
the police to ask about the time of a last drink 
or to wait 15 minutes unless the officer knew he 
had recently consumed. Judge LeReverend found 
the officer had reasonable and probable grounds 
and the breathalyser tests were admitted. He 
was convicted of driving over the legal limit4. 
 
The accused appealed to the Alberta Court of 
Queen’s Bench submitting that the officer’s 
failure to not make inquiry into the time of the 
accused’s last drink was fatal to the officer’s 
reasonable and probable grounds to make the 
breathalyzer demand. Justice Agrois, in 
dismissing the appeal, held that “waiting 15 
                                                 
4 See R. v. Szybunka, 2004 ABPC 52 
minutes is not mandatory unless the investigating 
constable has reasonable and articulabe reason 
to believe the accused has consumed alcohol 
within that time and knew the results of the 
approved screening device could not be relied 
on.”5 
 
The accused then sought leave to appeal before 
the Alberta Court of Appeal again arguing that 
the officer failed to take steps to ensure the 
screening tests was accurate and that the police 
are required to make enquiries as to the recent 
consumption of alcohol. In dismissing the 
application, Justice Berger, in chambers, stated: 
 
In my opinion, the decision of the Supreme 
Court of Canada in R. v. Bernshaw…is 
dispositive of the present application. In 
Bernshaw, the court held that the evidential 
testing of motorists represents a search and 
seizure within the meaning of s. 8 of the 
Charter and must be based on objectively 
verifiable reasonable and probable grounds. 
The thrust of the [accused’s] submission is 
that the failure of the investigating officer to 
comply with his training, which requires that 
he wait 15 minutes following a suspect’s last 
alcoholic drink before administering a 
screening test, takes this case outside the 
ambit of R. v. Bernshaw. I do not agree. Nor do 
I agree with the [accused’s] contention that it 
is arguable, in the circumstances of this case, 
that it is incumbent upon an investigating 
officer to inquire as to when the suspect 
consumed his last alcoholic beverage.  
 
The central inquiry is whether there is any 
evidence which might have caused the 
investigating constable to question when the 
[accused] had his last drink. Absent such 
evidence, there is no requirement that the 
investigating constable either determine when 
the last drink was consumed or defer 
administration of a screening test for 15 
minutes. Sopinka, J. in Bernshaw, speaks of 
“credible evidence to the contrary”, that leads 
an officer to believe that the suspect may 
have had a drink in the preceding 15 minutes. 
 
                                                 
5 See R. v. Szybunka, 2005 ABQB 686 
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In the case at bar, the trial judge found that 
there was no such evidence, and stated that 
the constable’s observation of the [accused] 
driving out of the parking lot did not equate 
with knowledge that he had consumed an 
alcoholic drink just prior to leaving. Reasonable 
grounds to require that a suspect submit to a 
screening device are capable of being negated 
if the officer knew or was wilfully blind to the 
proposition that the test to be administered 
might be unreliable. Leaving the parking lot of 
a bar does not satisfy the test. The actions of 
a suspect prior to departure from the bar may 
well be the subject of conjecture and 
speculation, but if not borne out by credible, 
cogent evidence, constitutes an uncertain 
foundation to contend that the constable 
knew, or ought to have known, that the 
screening test results would be unreliable. 
Indeed, it might well be argued that, given the 
constable’s training, the fact that he did not 
question the [accused] as to when he had his 
last drink, evidences a lack of concern 
regarding the reliability of the ensuing 
screening test results. On the other hand, if 
the question had been put, it might well be 
argued that the reliability of the screening 
test results was a live issue in the constable’s 
mind. 
 
As to the [accused’s] advice to the technician 
(that he stopped drinking at 11.00 p.m.), the 
trial court must consider the information 
available to the officer at the time of the 
breath demand, and decide whether the 
officer subjectively believed that the 
accused’s ability to drive was impaired by 
alcohol, and whether that subjective belief 
meets the objective standard of 
reasonableness. I agree with the Crown that in 
applying the objective test, the trial court 
must consider only the information available to 
the officer at the time that he formed his 
opinion; the grounds are not invalid simply 
because the officer relied on information 
which is ultimately proven to be wrong… Of 
course, it is always open to an accused to 
challenge the reliability of the tests and to 
question their probative value. 
 
… In my opinion, the evidence establishing the 
contention that the [accused] had consumed a 
substance which would skew the results of the 
screening test, is not, in this case, manifest. 
Accordingly, on the authority of R. v. 
Bernshaw…there was no requirement that the 
investigating officer wait a period of time to 
ensure that the screening test results were 
accurate. Nor was the constable required to 
inquire when the [accused] last consumed 
alcohol in order to ensure an accurate test. 
[paras. 7-11] 
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
ENTRY ONTO PRIVATE 
DRIVEWAY LAWFUL: 
OBSERVATIONS ADMISSIBLE 
R. v. Arnett, 2005 ABPC 246 
 
Police responded to a call about 
a suspicious vehicle driving 
slowly around a neighbourhood 
with its windows down and music 
blaring. The police attended to 
the area and found a car matching the 
description driving 25 km in a 50 km zone. The 
police followed it and saw it roll through a stop 
sign without stopping. The police emergency 
lights were activated and the accused drove 
about 40 yards before pulling into his driveway.  
 
The officer noted the accused had a strong 
smell of alcohol on his breath, red, glassy eyes, 
uncoordinated slow and deliberate motor skills 
and speech, and he was unfocussed. The officer 
asked him to get out of the vehicle. He was 
unsteady on his feet, his movements were slow 
and deliberate, and he held onto the car door so 
he wouldn’t fall. The officer formed the opinion 
the accused was impaired and he was arrested 
and given his Charter rights. While back at the 
police station, 42 minutes after the arrest, the 
officer read the breath demand to the accused. 
He subsequently provided two samples of his 
breath. 
 
At trial in Alberta Provincial Court on charges of 
impaired driving and over 80mg% the accused 
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submitted that his rights under the Charter 
were breached because the police entered his 
private property to detain him and conduct a 
search, without a warrant and without reasonable 
grounds, in circumstances that did not justify an 
arrest without a warrant. Furthermore, the 
police did not make the breath demand forthwith 
or as soon as practicable. Nor did they re-inform 
him of his right to counsel when making the 
breath demand, some 42 minutes after his 
arrest.  
 
As for whether the accused’s ss.8 and 10(b) 
rights were violated because of the 42 minute 
delay, Judge Daniel found the delay was too long 
and without good reason. Because of this delay, 
“the accused should have been reminded of his 
s.10(b) Charter right and offered the 
opportunity to contact counsel after the Breath 
Demand had been read to him at the station.” As 
well, the breath demand was not read “forthwith 
or as soon as practicable” as required by 
s.254(3) of the Criminal Code resulting in an 
unreasonable search and seizure of the accused’s 
breath. As a result of these violations, the 
breathalyzer certificate was excluded under 
s.24(2).  
 
However, Judge Daniel found all of the officer’s 
observational evidence obtained from the traffic 
stop admissible because there were no Charter 
breaches respecting the police entry onto the 
accused’s driveway. The judge rejected the 
argument “that as soon as the accused drove 
over his property line, that he thereby safely 
ensconced himself in legal sanctuary,” stating: 
 
…Firstly, the police had personally witnessed a 
violation of the Traffic Safety Act. They were 
under a legal duty to stop and detain the 
violator so they could deal appropriately with 
him. They had reasonable and probable 
grounds, both subjectively and objectively, to 
do so. The accused was under a legal obligation 
to immediately stop and identify himself. 
There was a clear nexus between the individual 
to be detained and the offence; the events 
were continuous. It was necessary to detain 
the accused so the police could perform their 
legally recognized statutory duties. This 
entailed stopping him and requiring him to 
identify himself and produce his license, 
registration and insurance as a prelude to 
issuing the ticket for failure to stop at a stop 
sign. 
 
The police signalled their intent that he should 
stop and identify himself by approaching 
within ten yards of the back of his motor 
vehicle and activating the overhead lights on 
their marked police van. They pursued him in 
this manner for about forty yards before he 
stopped in his driveway. If he had stopped on 
the roadway or in someone else’s driveway no 
issue of private property or immunity would 
have arisen. Just because he happened to stop 
in his own driveway it makes no logical or 
common sense for him to suddenly acquire a 
sanctuarial immunity from legal prosecution 
and his obligations under the Traffic Safety 
Act. 
 
Secondly, I find the police were in ‘hot’ or 
‘fresh’ pursuit. There does not have to be a 
high speed or lengthy chase for the police to 
be in ‘hot’ pursuit. The accused could not have 
been in any doubt whatsoever that the police 
wanted him to pull over. He chose not to stop 
immediately and kept driving. Granted, he did 
not travel a long distance…, he did not speed 
up, go through any more traffic stop signs or 
exit his vehicle and flee inside his home, but 
the fact remains that he did not stop 
immediately when required to do so. The police 
conducted the pursuit with reasonable 
diligence such that the pursuit and capture 
along with the commission of the offence can 
be considered as forming part of a single 
transaction. By exiting their police vehicle and 
going to the accused’s vehicle, they were 
simply continuing the ongoing pursuit on foot. 
Since he had not stopped when required, they 
had an option to arrest him without a warrant 
for failing to stop for a police officer. 
 
Thirdly, at common law, the police have a right 
to enter private premises to make an arrest 
when they have a warrant for arrest, to 
prevent a crime from being committed, when 
they are in hot pursuit having either witnessed 
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an offence or have arrived after an offence 
has been committed and having seen the 
offender flee the crime scene. Police can also 
enter private property to conduct an 
investigation in other circumstances without a 
warrant… The power is not limited to 
indictable offences. As was held in the Macooh 
case it can apply to Provincial offences where 
there is a right of arrest. …By entering onto 
[the accused’s] driveway, the police were 
simply continuing a pursuit already begun. They 
did not know it was his driveway, nor was there 
any way could they have been reasonably 
expected to know. 
 
Fourthly, the accused had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy. He remained in his car, 
in which there is a lesser expectation of 
privacy than in a home. The accused certainly 
must have expected the police to attend at his 
driver’s side window to follow up with their 
traffic stop. To that end he waited in the car 
for them. The window was rolled down and the 
police could easily converse with him. When 
the constable did ask for his driving 
particulars as he was legally entitled to do, he 
could not then ignore the signs of impairment 
immediately apparent to him. The accused did 
not hide in his car with the windows rolled up 
and the doors locked. He did not emerge from 
his car and order the police off his property. 
He did not point to any ‘no trespass’ signs 
because there weren’t any. There was no 
reason for the police to assume this was his 
driveway or that he had any reasonable 
expectation of privacy upon it. His actions 
belied any expectation of privacy under all the 
circumstances. In this case, when balancing 
the invasion of individual rights with the need 
for police to fulfill their legal duties, the 
minimal intrusion onto this accused’s driveway 
is reasonable in the context of the public 
purpose of the police fulfilling their lawful 
duties… 
 
Fifthly, this was a driveway and not a home. 
The vehicle was in plain view, as was the 
accused. Any interference with the accused’s 
property rights was minimal. There is an 
implied license for the police or anyone else on 
legitimate business to enter onto the driveway 
of a private residence…. The police were 
respectful and polite, acting in the course of 
their statutory duty to investigate, apprehend 
and lay charges. They did not draw their 
weapons. The accused was also respectful and 
cooperative. No violence was used or 
threatened…. 
 
Sixthly, there are a number of public policy 
reasons why the accused should not expect 
sanctuary from prosecution in all the 
circumstances of this case:  
a) A criminal should not be immune from 
arrest in his own home or driveway.  
b) There are occasions when a person’s privacy 
interests must yield to the public interest 
in executing due process against an 
offender. 
c) If police officers had to obtain a warrant 
in the instant circumstances, it would likely 
be impossible to identify their target – 
perhaps neighbours would have to be 
awoken and inconvenienced to see if they 
could identify the accused. While the police 
are engaged in that kind of inquiry, the 
offender could slip away and the 
opportunity for identification could be lost. 
Even with his identity confirmed a justice 
of the peace would have to be found to 
execute an arrest warrant. Valuable police 
time would be wasted and by the time the 
police officer got back with the warrant, 
the offender would likely have vacated the 
scene. 
d) If fugitives think they can escape 
prosecution merely by fleeing to their own 
driveway, chases that endanger the public 
and property are likely to ensue. Flight may 
result in loss of evidence. An offender’s 
flight should not be rewarded with 
immunity from prosecution. [references 
omitted, paras. 25-31] 
 
Even though the certificates of analysis were 
inadmissible for the over 80mg% charge, the 
accused was convicted of impaired driving based 
on the officer’s admissible observations during 
the lawful traffic stop. 
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
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CHARTER ARGUMENT TOO 
LATE 
R. v. Thibodeau, 2005 NBCA 81 
 
A police officer patrolling a 
municipal building parking lot in 
the evening saw two individuals 
between two cars escape 
behind a building. The officer 
went behind the building and saw a person speed 
off on an all-terrain vehicle (ATV). The driver of 
the ATV tried to pass through a fence opening 
but got stuck. Its wheels continued to spin and 
make holes in the ground. The officer 
approached, asked the driver to turn the ATV 
off, remove his helmet, and produce 
identification. The constable detected a strong 
odour of alcohol on the accused’s breath, noted 
his eyes were glassy and bloodshot, and that his 
speech was somewhat slurred. The accused was 
advised of his Charter rights and given the 
breath demand, which subsequently resulted in 
samples over the legal limit.  
 
At trial in New Brunswick Provincial Court the 
accused was convicted of operating a motor 
vehicle while over 80mg% when the trial judge 
ruled that the officer had an articulable cause 
to stop and question the accused under the 
circumstances because he was causing damage 
while trying to free the ATV. The accused, 
however, appealed to the New Brunswick Court 
of Queen’s Bench.  
 
Justice McIntyre of the New Brunswick Court 
of Queen’s Bench agreed that the officer had an 
articulable cause to stop and question the 
accused. Furthermore, Justice McIntyre found 
the police had another reason to approach the 
accused: 
 
Lastly, there are instances when a peace 
officer is entitled, and is in fact even under a 
duty, to approach an individual without 
articulable cause to believe he is involved in 
criminal activity. One such instance is when a 
peace officer decides to lend assistance to a 
person in distress. If the officer’s 
observations give him reasonable grounds to 
believe that the individual is committing an 
offence under section 253 of the Code or 
that he committed such an offence within the 
past three hours, he has cause to ask the 
individual to provide a breath sample for 
analysis. In my opinion, even if the constable 
in the case at bar had not seen the accused 
damage others’ property, he had cause to 
approach the accused for the sole reason that 
his vehicle was stuck and he needed help. 
However, [the constable] specifically stated 
that he stopped the [accused] because he was 
causing damage to the property of others. 
Thus, he would probably not otherwise have 
felt the need to approach or stop the 
[accused]6. [para. 8] 
 
Despite this finding, Justice McIntyre excluded 
the officer’s testimony respecting his articulable 
cause because the Crown never disclosed before 
the trial what the articulable cause was that 
prompted the officer to stop and question the 
accused. It was not in the officer’s notes and, as 
the accused contended, hearing it for the first 
time at trial prevented him from preparing to 
make full answer and defence. Since there was 
no articulable cause to stop the accused (which 
had been excluded) the breath demand was 
unlawful and an acquittal was entered. 
 
The Crown then appealed to the New Brunswick 
Court of Appeal arguing, among other grounds, 
that the trial judge erred by allowing the 
accused to rely on a ground of appeal not raised 
in the notice of appeal and by allowing the 
accused to plead a Charter violation not raised at 
trial. In a 2:1 judgment, the majority agreed 
with Crown, set aside the acquittal, and affirmed 
the conviction. Justice Deschenes, with Justice 
Richard concurring stated: 
 
After learning, during cross-examination of 
the police officer, that the latter had not 
indicated in his notebook that he had stopped 
and questioned [the accused] because he was 
causing damage to municipal property, [the 
                                                 
6 See R. v. Thibodeau, 2004 NBQB 253 
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accused] chose not to raise an issue that he 
now claims is a breach of the prosecution’s 
duty of disclosure. Assuming, for argument’s 
sake, that the information identified by the 
appeal judge should have been disclosed 
before the trial, [the accused] was 
nonetheless aware, during his trial, and even 
before the prosecution closed its case, of all 
the circumstances based on which the police 
officer stopped and questioned him. 
Assuming, for the purposes of this discussion, 
that a case has been made against the 
prosecution for not disclosing the information 
in question before the trial, at the most this 
would amount to a late disclosure, not a 
failure to disclose. If this late disclosure 
violated his right to make full answer and 
defence, it was up to [the accused] to break 
his silence before the trial judge and bring a 
motion for the remedy that he considered 
appropriate under s. 24(1) of the Charter. It 
was up to [the accused] to convince the trial 
judge that his right to make full answer and 
defence had been violated and that this 
violation of his constitutional right could only 
result in the exclusion of the evidence and his 
acquittal. In addition to failing to fulfil his 
duty to assert his right to make full answer 
and defence, [the accused] continued 
cross-examining the police officer, and 
testified in his own defence. 
 
If [the accused] had made a timely motion 
with respect to this issue instead of 
remaining silent about the whole matter, the 
trial judge would have had to rule on questions 
which were raised for the first time on 
appeal, and for which there is no factual 
basis. 
 
The trial judge would first have had to 
consider the information disclosed to [the 
accused]. As the Crown prosecutor has 
argued, even though the police officer did not 
enter in his notebook all the circumstances 
that caused him to stop and question [the 
accused], this information may have been 
found elsewhere in the file that was disclosed 
to him. Since the question was never raised at 
trial, the prosecution never had the 
opportunity to reply and the trial judge did 
not rule on it. Ultimately, [the accused] has 
never shown that the prosecution failed in its 
duty to disclose anything. 
 
Moreover, even if the trial judge had found 
that the right to disclosure had been violated 
in this case, [the accused] would still have had 
to show that this violation infringed his right 
to make full answer and defence. And 
assuming that [the accused] had been 
successful at this stage, the trial judge would 
still have had to choose the remedy that he 
considered appropriate in the circumstances. 
Among other forms of relief, he might have 
granted an adjournment. Since the trial judge 
was never called upon to decide these 
questions (because they were never raised), 
some of the remedies that would have been 
appropriate are obviously no longer available 
following a conviction. 
 
In light of this, the summary conviction appeal 
court was not able to apply the preliminary 
test in Stinchcombe, namely whether there 
was an actual violation of [the accused’s] right 
to disclosure, notwithstanding the fact that 
certain information was not in the police 
officer’s notebook. In my opinion, the general 
rule that appellate courts do not allow a 
question to be raised for the first time on an 
appeal applies to the instant case and the 
appeal judge erred in law in allowing [the 
accused] to argue the defence at issue before 
him. … 
 
In my opinion, when an accused standing trial 
believes that the prosecution has failed to 
comply with its duty to disclose, he must 
break his silence and bring the issue to the 
court’s attention so that the court can deal 
with it. The accused cannot remain silent on 
the question, and then attempt for the first 
time, on an appeal, to raise an alleged breach 
of the duty to disclose…. 
 
As the appeal judge stated in his decision, it 
is true that the Crown prosecutor did not 
object when this new ground of appeal was 
raised extemporaneously for the first time 
before him. However, even if one assumes 
that the prosecution had a duty to object in 
the instant case, the appeal judge had no 
factual basis on which to rule on the question, 
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which had to be decided at trial. [references 
omitted, paras. 15-21] 
 
Justice Rice, however, disagreed with his 
colleagues. He stated: 
 
The appeal judge had the jurisdiction and the 
duty to intervene if he believed that the 
accused’s Charter right had been violated. In 
my opinion, it is reasonable to conclude that 
the police officer, who formed suspicions 
regarding the accused as the latter was 
moving around the area being patrolled, 
decided to stop and question the accused 
without having reasonable grounds to do so. 
He abandoned this plan in the belief that the 
accused would use a path that was 
inaccessible to him. The grounds involving 
damage to others’ property, which he 
advances as a basis for stopping and 
questioning the accused (and which were not 
disclosed to the accused before the trial), 
should have been disclosed before the trial so 
they could be investigated and questioned. 
In view of the importance of this Charter 
issue, I cannot find that the failure to raise it 
at a given stage of the proceedings would 
result in the setting aside of this ground of 
appeal… [para 2]  
 




R. v. Singh, 2005 BCCA 591 
 
After awaking, the complainant 
found the accused inside an 
apartment in the early morning 
hours walking towards the door. 
The complainant grabbed him and called 911. The 
accused was subsequently apprehended by police 
outside the building after briefly eluding them. 
He was convicted in the Supreme Court of 
British Columbia on a charge of break and enter 
with intent to commit an indictable offence. The 
trial judge concluded the accused did not rebut 
the presumption found in s.348(2)(a) of the 
Criminal Code, which provides that evidence an 
accused “broke and entered a place or attempted 
to break and enter a place is, in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary, proof that he broke 
and entered the place or attempted to do so, as 
the case may be, with intent to commit an 
indictable offence therein.” 
 
The accused appealed his conviction to the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal arguing that his 
s.7 Charter right had been violated because the 
Criminal Code presumption breached the tenets 
of fundamental justice by creating the 
possibility that an innocent person might be 
convicted. Justice Hall, authoring the unanimous 
appeal court judgment, disagreed. Relying on and 
applying the reasoning of other court decisions, 
he found that the presumption did not violate s.7 
because break and enters are epidemic, the 
clearance rate is low, and the prosecution should 
have the benefit of this “evidentiary assist” 
presumption.  The appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
DIRECT OBSERVATION OF 
DRIVING NOT NECESSARY FOR 
ASD DEMAND 
R. v. Campbell, 2005 BCCA 619 
 
A witness called police after 
seeing a Lexus operated by the 
accused driven in an erratic 
manner including weaving in its 
lane and striking the curb at slow speeds, as well 
as running a red light and stop sign. The witness 
saw the Lexus park and the accused exit and 
then get into a Jeep as a passenger. The Jeep 
was subsequently stopped in the parking lot by 
police and the officer noted the accused had a 
flushed face, watery eyes, and a smell of liquor. 
When asked for her driver’s licence, the accused 
retrieved it from the locked trunk of her Lexus. 
The officer formed a suspicion the accused had 
alcohol in her body and a roadside screening test 
was given. She failed, a breath demand was 
made, and the accused provided samples of her 
breath over the legal limit. She was convicted of 
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over 80mg% in British Columbia Provincial Court 
and her conviction was affirmed on appeal to the 
Supreme Court of British Columbia. 
 
The accused appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal arguing that a police officer 
making a demand under s.254(2) of the Criminal 
Code must actually see the subject of the 
demand in care and control of the vehicle when 
the demand is made. Section 254(2) of the 
Criminal Code states: 
 
Justice Huddart, for the unanimous court, 
dismissed the appeal. In her view the demand 
was valid and there was no need for the officer 
making the demand to make it only when a person 
is actually seen driving or in care and control. In 
holding that the trial judge did not err, Justice 
Huddart stated: 
 
To establish an offence for refusing to give a 
sample of breath under this section, the 
Crown must establish the peace officer who 
made the demand had a reasonable suspicion 
the person in question had alcohol in his body 
at the time of the demand, and that he had 
been operating a motor vehicle or had the 
care or control of a motor vehicle. 
……… 
Virtually all the [accused’s] authorities 
implicitly or explicitly adopt this 
understanding of the application of s. 254(2) 
as do those submitted by the [Crown].  The 
words "is driving" or "has the care or control" 
are to be given some past signification.  The 
cases differ in outcome as a result of factual 
findings as to whether the Crown has 
established on the evidence either that the 
accused's driving occurred within a time 
frame reasonably contemplated in giving "is" a 
past tense interpretation, or that the accused 
had care or control at the time of the 
demand. 
 
I can see no error in the conclusion of the 
summary conviction court appeal judge that in 
this case the evidence supported a finding 
that the demand was made as soon as 
reasonably practicable by the…police officer, 
just as it would have supported a conclusion 
that the accused was in care or control of her 
motor vehicle at the time of the demand. 
 
It is with this understanding of s. 254(2), the 
question of law posed to this court must be 
answered.  The [accused] suggests that a 
demand pursuant to s. 254(2) cannot be made 
unless the demanding officer has direct 
knowledge of the driving or care or control of 
a motor vehicle.  In R. v. MacPherson (2000), 
150 C.C.C. (3d) 540 (Ont. C.A.), Charron J.A. 
(as she then was) explained for the court that 
a valid demand requires only that a police 
officer reasonably suspect the accused has 
alcohol in his or her body.  The Crown must 
prove the accused is "driving" or "has the 
care or control" at the time of the demand, 
but may do so through means other than the 
officer's knowledge or observation. 
 
I accept those propositions.  In this case 
the…police officer had information from [a 
witness], which led him to believe that [the 
accused] had been driving her vehicle in the 
previous few minutes.  He observed signs of 
"liquor" consumption, and he watched as she 
opened the trunk of her car with a key and 
retrieved from it her purse and driver's 
licence.  That evidence justified the 
reasonable suspicion he formed that [the 
accused] had alcohol in her body while 
recently driving and not having surrendered 
the care and control of her motor vehicle.  
His direct observation of her driving was not 
required. [paras. 11-16] 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
s.254(2) Criminal Code 
Where a peace officer reasonably suspects that a 
person who is operating a motor vehicle or vessel or 
operating or assisting in the operation of an aircraft 
or of railway equipment or who has the care or 
control of a motor vehicle, vessel or aircraft or of 
railway equipment, whether it is in motion or not, has 
alcohol in the person's body, the peace officer may, 
by demand made to that person, require the person 
to provide forthwith such a sample of breath as in 
the opinion of the peace officer is necessary to 
enable a proper analysis of the breath to be made by 
means of an approved screening device and, where 
necessary, to accompany the peace officer for the 
purpose of enabling such a sample of breath to be 
taken. 
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INCIDENTAL SEARCH DOES 
NOT REQUIRE WARRANT 
R. v. Munro, 2005 BCCA 610 
 
An undercover police officer who 
suspected the accused might be 
transporting drugs requested 
another officer stop her. The 
second officer stopped the 
accused for speeding as she drove along a 
highway and arrested her for driving while 
prohibited. The officer could also smell a 
moderate odour of vegetative marihuana in the 
car. The officer read the accused her rights and 
placed her in the police car.  
 
The vehicle was impounded under s.104 of the 
Motor Vehicle Act and searched by a police dog 
at the roadside. In the car police found a gym 
bag containing four vacuum-sealed bags with 
marihuana. The accused was then arrested for 
possession of marihuana and taken to the police 
station. Other bags found in the vehicle were 
also taken to the police station, one of which was 
found to contain cocaine.  
 
At trial in British Columbia Supreme Court the 
accused was acquitted on a charge of possession 
of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.  The 
trial judge ruled that the search of the vehicle 
was warrantless and therefore unreasonable, 
even if the officer had reasonable grounds to 
arrest the accused. There were no exigent 
circumstances that made it not feasible to 
obtain a search warrant. In the judge’s view the 
Charter violation was serious and the evidence 
was excluded under s.24(2).  
 
The Crown appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal arguing that the trial judge 
failed to properly analyze the legal issues 
pertaining to the admissibility of the evidence. 
Justice Low, writing for the unanimous appeal 
court, agreed with the Crown’s submission. The 
trial judge erred in restricting his approach to a 
requirement that the Crown prove it was not 
practicable to obtain a search warrant through 
the existence of exigent circumstances.  
 
Although “the police officers could have 
obtained a search warrant and had time to do 
so…there is no requirement in law that a search 
warrant be obtained if the search is conducted 
incidentally to the lawful arrest of the suspect 
for any of three reasons; to ensure the safety 
of the police and the public; to protect evidence 
from destruction; or…for ‘the discovery of 
evidence which can be used at the arrestee’s 
trial’,” said Justice Low. In this case, the trial 
judge did not consider the need to discover 
evidence in his analysis. Since the trial judge did 
not consider the appropriate factors, the appeal 
was allowed and a new trial was ordered.  
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
EXPERT EVIDENCE BASED ON 
DISBELIEVED TESTIMONY 
REJECTED 
R. v. Boucher, 2005 SCC 72 
 
The accused was charged with 
driving while over 80mg%. He 
had provided two samples of his 
breath to police resulting in 
readings of 93mg% and 92mg%. At trial in 
Quebec Municipal Court the accused testified he 
drank two large beers during the two to three 
hours preceding his arrest. He also called an 
expert who testified that the breathalyzer 
readings did not correspond with the level of 
alcohol expected of a person with the accused’s 
physical characteristics and the amount he 
claimed he drank.  
 
In the expert’s view, the accused’s blood alcohol 
level should have been 60mg%. A reading in the 
90mg% to 95mg% would require the accused 
drinking twice as much as he said. Furthermore, 
the expert stated that if the accused had drank 
just before his arrest, the level recorded on the 
breathalyzer might have been different that at 
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the time of driving because the alcohol would not 
yet have been absorbed at the time of arrest, 
but would have been absorbed at the time of 
testing. The expert, however, relied on 
statistical averages and did not provide evidence 
about the accused’s alcohol tolerance. 
 
The trial judge found the accused’s testimony 
not credible. Since his testimony was not 
credible it could not serve as a basis for the 
expert’s evidence. Thus, there was no evidence 
to the contrary that could rebut the statutory 
presumption found in the Criminal Code. He was 
convicted. 
 
The accused appealed to the Quebec Superior 
Court arguing the trial judge erred. In the 
Superior Court judge’s view, the evidence as a 
whole may still raise a reasonable doubt 
concerning whether the accused’s blood alcohol 
level exceeded the legal limit even if his 
evidence about how much he drank was 
disbelieved. In this case, based in part on the 
absence of physical symptoms, the Superior 
Court judge found the accused raised a 
reasonable doubt. He was acquitted.  
 
The Crown appealed to the Quebec Court of 
Appeal. Although the three judges wrote 
separate opinions, the acquittal was upheld. The 
Crown then appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Canada arguing that the trial judge did not err in 
rejecting the expert’s testimony because it was 
based on the accused’s disbelieved testimony. 
 
Justice Deschamps, with four other justices 
concurring, first reviewed the presumptions 
found in s.258 of the Criminal Code. She stated: 
 
Where samples of an accused's breath have 
been taken pursuant to a demand made under 
s. 254(3) Cr. C., Parliament has established 
separate presumptions in s. 258(1) Cr. C. to 
facilitate proof of the accused's blood alcohol 
level:  two presumptions of identity and one 
presumption of accuracy.  According to the 
presumption of identity in s. 258(1)(c) Cr. C., 
the accused's blood alcohol level at the time 
when the offence was alleged to have been 
committed is the same as the level at the time 
of the breathalyzer test.  According to s. 
258(1)(d.1) Cr. C., where the alcohol level 
exceeds 80 mg at the time of the test, there 
is a presumption that it also exceeded 80 mg 
at the time when the offence was alleged to 
have been committed.  The presumption of 
accuracy in s. 258(1)(g) Cr. C. establishes 
prima facie that the technician's reading 
provides an accurate determination of the 
blood alcohol level at the time of the test.  
These presumptions have certain similarities, 





The presumption of identity in s. 258(1)(c) Cr. 
C. can be rebutted by evidence that tends to 
show that the blood alcohol level at the time 
when the offence was alleged to have been 
committed was different from the level 
measured at the time of the breathalyzer 
test….  Thus, in St. Pierre, the accused 
consumed two miniature bottles of vodka after 
being arrested but before taking a 
breathalyzer test, and this fact was capable 
of rebutting the presumption that the blood 
alcohol level measured at the time of the test 
was the same as the blood alcohol level at the 
time she was driving her vehicle. 
 
Such evidence to the contrary adduced to 
rebut the presumption of identity does not 
deprive the prosecution of the benefit of the 
presumption that the certificate accurately 
states the blood alcohol level at the time of 
the breathalyzer test (the presumption of 
accuracy). The Crown can still prove that the 
accused's blood alcohol level at the time when 
the offence was alleged to have been 
committed exceeded 80 mg; one piece of 
evidence would then be the reading taken by 
the breathalyzer, the accuracy of which is not 
in dispute.  Additional evidence would be 
needed, however, to prove the blood alcohol 
level at the time when the offence was alleged 
to have been committed. 
 
Evidence to the contrary that is adduced to 
rebut the presumption of accuracy in s. 
258(1)(g) Cr. C. must tend to show that the 
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certificate does not in fact correctly reflect 
the blood alcohol level at the time of the 
breathalyzer test.  This evidence must raise a 
reasonable doubt about the accuracy of the 
breathalyzer result.  
 
Shortly after St. Pierre, Parliament amended 
the Criminal Code to add s. 258(1)(d.1) Cr. C., 
which expands the presumption of identity.  
According to this new provision, where the 
accused's blood alcohol level exceeded 80 mg 
at the time of the breathalyzer test, it will be 
presumed, in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary, to have exceeded 80 mg at the time 
when the offence was alleged to have been 
committed.  The effect of the enactment of s. 
258(1)(d.1) Cr. C. was not to change the type 
of evidence needed to rebut the presumption 
of identity in s. 258(1)(c) Cr. C. or the 
presumption of accuracy in s. 258(1)(g) Cr. C., 
but to reinforce the presumption of identity. 
[paras. 19-22] 
 
In establishing evidence to the contrary, an 
accused has no burden of proof to meet in 
rebutting any of these presumptions. Rather, if a 
judge has a reasonable doubt that the blood 
alcohol level recorded was not the same at the 
time of driving, the level did not exceed 80mg%, 
or the certificate did not accurately reflect the 
blood alcohol level, then the presumptions do not 
apply.  
 
In this case the judge did not believe the 
accused and therefore the expert’s calculations 
were of no assistance in “neutralizing” the 
presumption. As for the lack of physical indicia 
of impairment raising a reasonable doubt as to 
the application of the presumption, Justice 
Deschamps wrote: 
 
Evidence that there are no symptoms is indeed 
very relevant to the charge of impaired 
driving.  In fact, this explains why, when the 
prosecution closed its case, it asked the judge 
to acquit [the accused] on that charge.  The 
situation is quite different for the charge of 
driving with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg.  
The offence of driving with a level exceeding 
80 mg does not require proof of impairment.  
The absence of symptoms of impairment is 
generally not sufficient to constitute evidence 
to the contrary that can be used to rebut the 
presumption of accuracy.  This is because a 
lack of evidence of the usual symptoms of 
impairment, such as staggering and slurred 
speech, does not provide information about 
the actual blood alcohol level.  Symptoms such 
as these usually accompany extremely high 
blood alcohol levels.  Conversely, very low 
levels are generally consistent with an absence 
of symptoms.  An absence of symptoms is 
therefore not significant in itself if the court 
does not know the accused's level of alcohol 
tolerance. [para. 33] 
 
Nor did the low breathalyzer readings provide 
evidence to the contrary. She held: 
 
…I find it difficult to see how the fact that 
the alcohol levels were 93 mg and 92 mg…could 
constitute evidence that the breathalyzer 
result was inaccurate.  How can the results of 
93 mg and 92 mg show that the result itself 
was inaccurate? The result is precisely the 
figure that the accused claimed was 
inaccurate.  To achieve his goal, he should 
logically have tried to discredit that figure, 
not to use it.  The result cannot be both 
evidence and evidence contrary to that 
evidence. [para. 35] 
 
The majority set aside the acquittal and 
restored the conviction of over 80mg%. The 
other four justices would have allowed the 
appeal but ordered a new trial because they felt 
the trial judge erred in assessing and rejecting 
the accused’s testimony. 
 




Do all the good you can, by all the means you can, 
in all the ways you can, in all the places you can, 
at all the times you can, to all the people you can, 
as long as ever you can —Phaedrus 
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WARRANT BASED ON PLAIN 
VIEW OBSERVATIONS 
REASONABLE 
R. v. Jackson, 2005 ABCA 430 
 
After a stabbing victim had 
been found dead in his 
bunkhouse, police requested 
camp security help identify 
occupied rooms so police could 
obtain the names of possible witnesses. As well, 
the police wanted the bunkhouse evacuated to 
protect the crime scene and prevent 
contamination. One of the security officers told 
police that the accused was in his room. A police 
officer went to the room and knocked on the 
door, which was left ajar. The officer asked if 
he could come in and the accused said, “Sure”.   
 
The officer entered the small room, told the 
accused why he was there, and asked his name, 
date of birth, and which shift he last worked. 
The accused answered each question and also 
told the officer he sold things around the camp, 
pointing to a cooler on the floor he said he sold 
water from. Beside the cooler the officer saw a 
pair of boots—one on its side—with a similar 
tread pattern as one seen in blood in the 
victim’s room. The officer saw a second pair of 
boots under a desk and asked the accused if he 
could look at both pairs. The accused said “Yes”.  
 
One of the boots by the water cooler with the 
similar tread pattern also had a moist dark stain 
on its toe which the officer believed was blood. 
The accused was then arrested for first degree 
murder and advised of his right to a lawyer. 
During the one hour transport to the police 
detachment, the accused was not questioned but 
made spontaneous remarks, including knowing 
the identity of the victim even though it had not 
been disclosed to him.   
 
Although the police did not seize the boots, 
they subsequently obtained a search warrant 
and it was later determined that the boots with 
the similar tread pattern had blood on them 
that matched the DNA of the victim. As well, 
blue jeans and a shirt belonging to the accused 
had blood on it matching the victim’s blood. At 
trial in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench the 
accused argued, among other things, that the 
warrantless search when police entered his 
room, saw the boots, and examined them was 
unreasonable.  
 
The trial judge, however, found the search was 
reasonable under s.489(2) of the Criminal Code 
and the common law plain view doctrine. The 
officer was lawfully present in the accused’s 
room by express consent, he was in the lawful 
execution of his duty in evacuating the 
bunkhouse to secure the scene, the boots were 
inadvertently discovered, and it was immediately 
apparent by the tread pattern the boots might 
be evidence.  The accused was convicted of 
second degree murder.  
 
The accused appealed to the Alberta Court of 
Appeal, in part, contending that the trial judge 
erred in her analysis of the plain view doctrine 
and that his rights under s.8 of the Charter 
were violated. The court, however, disagreed. 
The legal basis for the inspection of the 
accused’s boots in his room was well established 
and the trial judge did not err. The accused’s 
appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
FAIL RESULT CANNOT BE 
USED FOR GROUNDS 
UNLESS DEVICE ‘APPROVED’   
R. v. Arsenault, 2005 NBCA 110 
 
A police officer saw the 
accused leave a tavern, stagger 
across the street, drop his 
keys, and leave in his truck. The 
officer followed the accused for about one 
kilometre and stopped him to check documents 
and investigate his suspicion regarding sobriety. 
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The officer detected an odour of alcohol on the 
accused’s breath and noted his eyes were glassy. 
The officer demanded the accused provide a 
breath sample into an approved screening device 
and he failed. A breathalyzer demand was then 
made and the accused provided samples over the 
legal limit. 
 
At trial in New Brunswick Provincial Court the 
officer testified that he was qualified to 
operate an approved screening device and that it 
was operating properly, but he described it as a 
“Draeger”—which is a manufacturer of an 
approved screening device7. The trial judge ruled 
that the Crown failed to establish that the 
device used was an approved screening device 
under the Criminal Code and that the fail reading 
could not be used to form reasonable grounds 
for the breathalyzer demand. Without the fail 
reading, the officer did not have the requisite 
grounds for the breath demand thereby making 
the seizure of the accused’s breath unreasonable 
under s.8 of the Charter. The certificate was 
excluded and the accused was acquitted. An 
appeal to the New Brunswick Court of Queen’s 
Bench was dismissed. 
 
The Crown appealed to the New Brunswick Court 
of Appeal arguing, in part, that the lower court 
erred in finding that the Crown must prove the 
screening device was approved under the 
Criminal Code. In holding that the Crown did 
bear the burden of showing the device used by 
the police officer was approved under the 
Criminal Code, Justice Deschenes, for the 
unanimous court, stated: 
 
… In my view, unless there is some evidence to 
establish it, a court is not entitled to assume 
that a screening device used by a peace 
officer in collecting a breath sample is an 
approved screening device. That evidence is 
necessary to establish the statutory authority 
under which the breath sample is obtained. 
Peace officers are only entitled to require 
drivers to provide samples for testing on an 
approved screening device and the approved 
                                                 
7 See R. v. Arsenault, 2004 NBQB 181 
screening device is the only one that in fact 
can be used to collect the sample. The finding 
by the trial judge that the Crown had failed to 
establish that [the accused’s] breath sample 
had been collected by using an approved 
screening device simply means that the fail 
result was not obtained within the legislative 
scheme envisaged by the Code. The "Draeger" 
machine used was not an "approved screening 
device" as defined by the Criminal Code and 
regulations. Unlike the results from an 
"approved screening device" the results 
obtained in this case cannot be presumed to be 
reliable. Only a "fail" reading on an "approved 
screening device", as defined by the Code, can 
provide the necessary reasonable and probable 
grounds. Where the particular screening 
device used has been approved under the 
statutory scheme, an officer is usually entitled 
to rely on its accuracy. The test results on the 
"Draeger" provided a result that has no 





In the case before us, the demand under s. 
254(2) was unauthorized and unlawful…because 
the device to be used by [the officer] and 
which was in fact used to collect the fail 
result, was not proved to be an approved 
screening device. In my view…I do not see how 
the fail results in the case before us can be 
admissible to establish honest belief, 
considering it was obtained from a device not 
proved to be an approved device. 
Accordingly…I conclude, as did the trial judge 
and the appeal court, that [the officer] was 
not entitled to rely upon the fail result to 
form the honest belief required for the 
breathalyzer demand which followed. 
Accordingly, the trial judge and the appeal 
judge who agreed with him did not err in law in 
refusing to consider such results in deciding 
the issue of honest belief. 
 
I reach this conclusion despite a long list of 
cases which hold that the question of whether 
a peace officer holds an honest belief that a 
person is committing an offence under s. 253 
must be measured by the facts as understood 
by the peace officer at the time when the 
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demand is made. In addition, an honest belief 
cannot be dependant upon a ruling made during 
the course of a trial that the Crown has failed 
to prove that the screening device used to 
collect the breath sample was an approved 
screening device. …[A] finding that a peace 
officer personally held an honest belief that 
an offence had been committed under s. 253 is 
not determinative. In fact, regardless of the 
peace officer's honestly held personal views, 
the objective component on the question of 
honest belief must be considered and the 
honest belief must be justifiable from an 
objective point of view. The objective test is 
that a reasonable person, standing in the shoes 
of the peace officer who made the demand, 
would have believed that [the accused] 
committed an offence under s. 253. Again, in 
dealing with the objective component, the 
cases hold that the court should not be 
concerned with the fact that the Crown has 
failed to prove that the screening device used 
was an approved screening device and that the 
function of the court is to look "at the facts 
known by or available to the peace officer at 
the time he or she formed the belief" and 
decide if, viewed from the objective vantage 
point of the reasonable person, the grounds 
are justifiable… 
 
…[T]here is an argument to be made that the 
application of the subjective and objective 
components to determine the question of 
honest belief could lead one to conclude that 
[the officer] held an honest belief in this case. 
However…[the officer] was not entitled to rely 
on the fail result as it was obtained by the use 
of a device not proven to be an approved one. 
Thus, by applying the objective component to 
the question of honest belief, there is nothing 
unusual in finding that, in fact, [the officer] 
did not have the honest belief required 
despite [his] genuine personal belief that he 
had reasonable grounds to make the demand. 
[paras. 23-25]  
 
Without the fail result, the trial judge concluded 
the officer did not have sufficient reasonable 
grounds upon which to base the breathalyzer 
demand despite the other indicia of impairment. 
Although another judge may have come to a 
different conclusion, his finding was not a 
palpable or overriding error requiring appellant 
interference.  Nor did the fact that the accused 
complied with the breathalyzer demand render 
the seizure reasonable. Justice Deschenes held: 
 
…In this case, the samples were admittedly 
collected following a demand and without a 
warrant. Thus, the onus was on the Crown to 
prove the reasonableness of the seizure. As 
the Crown failed to establish an honest belief 
to make the demand, it was therefore unlawful 
and unauthorized. In such circumstances, 
because the search and seizure was not 
authorized by law, it cannot be regarded as 
reasonable. In my view, the Crown has failed to 
discharge the onus of establishing 
reasonableness and the appeal judge was 
correct in agreeing with the trial judge that 
[the accused’s] right under s. 8 to be secure 
against unreasonable seizure was violated in 
the course of obtaining the breathalyzer 
results. [para. 33] 
 
The breath certificate was inadmissible under 
s.24(2) of the Charter and the Crown’s appeal 
was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
OFFICER LACKS SUBJECTIVE 
BELIEF FOR SAFETY SEARCH 
R. v. Spitale, 2005 BCPC 0586 
 
A police officer saw the 
accused, who was known to him, 
sitting on the steps of a 
building two blocks from a very 
high drug and prostitution 
crime  area. He had a glass crack pipe in his hand 
and closed his hand over it as the police 
approached. The officer advised the accused he 
was under investigation for possession of a 
controlled substance and the pipe was removed 
from the accused’s hand. The officer did not see 
cocaine residue on the pipe. As the officer began 
a pat down search, the accused removed a plastic 
bag containing 34 rocks of cocaine from inside 
the front of his pants. He was arrested for 
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possession of a controlled substance and $137 
was found on him. He was charged with 
possession of cocaine for the purpose of 
trafficking. 
 
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court, the 
accused applied to have the evidence excluded 
under s.24(2) of the Charter, arguing his rights 
under s.8 were violated by the search. In 
addressing whether the search was justified, 
Judge A. Rounthwaite first examined the validity 
of the detention. In her view, the detention was 
justified because the accused was found in a 
neighbourhood known for drug trafficking and he 
was in possession of a crack pipe. This was 
sufficient to detain, but not arrest him.  
 
The removal of the crack pipe from the 
accused’s hand was problematic. The officer 
testified he had no fear for his or his partner’s 
safety. Although the judge found it would be 
objectively reasonable to take the crack pipe—it 
could be broken and constitute a danger—the 
officer did not have the necessary subjective 
belief. He said he had no fear for his safety. 
Rather, he took the pipe to investigate a drug 
offence. The cocaine rocks were recovered 
during a search incident to investigative 
detention—not incident to arrest—thereby 
breaching the accused’s s.8 rights because the 
search was undertaken to locate evidence, not 
for safety.  
 
Judge Routhwaite also outlined four guiding 
principles after reviewing the case law in similar 
circumstances. She stated: 
 
…the law is actually quite straight forward on 
this topic: 
 
1.         Possession of a crack pipe has 
repeatedly been held to provide 
reasonable grounds for investigative 
detention where it occurs in 
circumstances giving rise to a reasonable 
suspicion that the individual possesses 
drugs (e.g. a neighbourhood known for 
drug use, the officer’s experience, the 
location and behaviour of the individual 
and others). 
  
2.         Investigative detentions must be 
brief; police officers must tell detainees 
the reason for their detention; and 
detainees are not obliged to answer 
questions.  
  
3.         During investigative detention 
officers may conduct a protective pat 
down search of the detainee where they 
believe on reasonable grounds that their 
safety or the safety of others is at risk; 
however, they may not search the 
detainee for evidence. 
  
4.         Only where there are reasonable 
grounds for arrest, viewed subjectively 
and objectively, may officers arrest and 
conduct a search incidental to arrest in 
order to obtain evidence, to prevent 
escape, or for safety. [para. 15] 
 
Since the accused’s rights were violated, the 
evidence was excluded under s.24(2) because its 
admission would bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute. In her concluding 
comments, Judge Routhwaite stated: 
 
Evidence should not be excluded to punish the 
police, but to admit evidence obtained by an 
officer who, from his testimony, appears to 
have been ignorant of the legal boundaries of 
his power to search people, would encourage 
unlawful activity by police [para. 19] 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
SAFETY SEARCH INTO ITEM 
BEYOND ACCESS OF DETAINEE 
UNREASONABLE 
R. v. Mohammed, 2005 BCPC 0593 
 
While responding to a fight in 
progress arising from a road 
rage or motor vehicle collision, a 
constable was flagged down by 
the accused driving a vehicle 
matching one of the vehicle descriptions 
provided. He had a bloody face, chipped tooth 
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and ripped shirt. He said he was jumped by four 
to six males and motioned to an intersection 
about three blocks away. A corporal radioed the 
constable from the scene of the altercation and 
reported a handgun was found on the roadway. 
The constable detained the accused for a 
weapons investigation, patted him down, and 
asked if there were any weapons in the car. The 
accused opened the door and the constable 
visually inspected the car. The officer reached 
for a CD case seen inside the passenger 
compartment, but the accused protested. The 
CD case was similar in weight and size to that 
which could contain a weapon. A struggle 
resulted; the accused was handcuffed and put in 
the rear of the police car. The corporal attended 
to the vehicle and opened the CD case, finding 
cocaine.  
 
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the 
corporal testified, in part, to the following: 
 
• Upon finding the handgun, the seriousness 
and risk of the call had risen  and in her 
experience where there is one weapon there 
may be more; 
• She believe she could “clear a suspect and 
vehicle for weapons” under these 
circumstances; 
• Although the accused was patted down and 
handcuffed, he may be released and again 
have access to his car; 
• She did not have reasonable and probable 
grounds to apply for a search warrant 
 
The accused argued that his rights under ss.8 
and 9 of the Charter were breached. First, he 
submitted that the investigative detention was 
arbitrary because there was no reasonable cause 
to detain him. He approached the police to make 
a complaint and there was nothing to suggest he 
was a suspect in any offence.  
 
After reviewing case law in the area of 
investigative detention, Judge Baird Ellan ruled 
the detention lawful. She stated: 
 
Here…there was a complaint of a fight, 
perhaps a road rage situation.  It involved 
two vehicles.  [The Corporal] noted that 
the accused’s vehicle was clearly linked by 
description to the scene, and the accused 
by his own admission was involved in the 
incident.  Coupled with his agitated state, 
and the discovery of an apparent weapon 
at the scene, the circumstances, in the 
Corporal’s view, necessitated an 
investigation as to the accused’s role in 
the incident.  While it does not appear 
that anything came of that investigation 
other than the offence before me, the 
fact that the accused may have been a 
victim and no more does not detract from 
the assessment, which relates to what 
was reasonably necessary, in the mind of 




…While that cause must, as with arrest 
grounds, be objectively supported, the 
standard is not that which might be applied on 
quiet reflection, but that appropriate in the 
exigencies of the moment.  Here, viewed 
objectively and in the totality of the 
circumstances as outlined above, I am of the 
opinion that the officer had sufficient cause 
to detain the accused to investigate further 
his role in the events about which the caller 
complained, particularly in light of the 
discovery at the scene of what appeared to be 
a handgun.  It must also be considered 
whether the resultant interference with the 
accused’s liberty was reasonable and minimal. 
 In my view it was, particularly in light of the 
fact that it was the accused who initially 
approached the officer.  This was not an 
arbitrary or random stop as considered in 
many of the cases.  There was a particular 
crime alleged or at least a report of an 
incident that may have been criminal.  At the 
point when the accused was detained, there 
was little more interference with his liberty 
than there would have been if the officer had 
simply taken his complaint, other than to 
change the complexion and focus of the 
officer’s inquiry.  Whether the subsequent 
search and ensuing events were reasonable is a 
separate question related to the scope of the 
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search power following a justified detention. 
[para 16] 
 
However, opening the CD case exceeded the 
scope permissible as incident to investigative 
detention. Although the pat down search, visual 
inspection of the car’s interior, handcuffing, and 
placing the accused in the police vehicle, as well 
as the removal of the CD case from the 
accused’s possession, were all reasonable in the 
circumstances, opening the CD case was not. At 
the time the CD case was opened, it was no 
longer in the accused’s physical possession nor 
accessible to him. In ruling the examination of 
the CD case unreasonable, Judge Baird Ellan 
stated: 
 
…[T]he question becomes whether there was a 
realistic concern that officer safety required 
the immediate inspection of the case, where it 
was no longer accessible to the accused, and 
would not become accessible, unless he was 
released from custody without an arrest or 
escaped from police custody and from his 
handcuffs.  If arrested as a result of the 
investigation, the case could clearly be 
searched incidentally.  If released following 
elimination of the cause for his detention, the 
ancillary police safety authorization to search 
must also be taken to be eliminated.  
 
It is doubtful, in my respectful view, that an 
authorization to search after investigation 
before returning an item seized to its 
owner…could survive Mann.  In any event, 
bearing in mind that this is a warrantless 
search and the burden of proof rests with the 
Crown, I do not believe the Crown has met the 
onus of establishing on a balance of 
probabilities in this case that the incidental 
officer safety search authorization extends to 
an item outside the area readily or reasonably 
accessible to the accused while he is detained.  
I therefore find that the search of the CD 
case was a breach of the accused’s section 8 
rights. [paras 31-32] 
 
After finding the admission of the evidence 
would bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute, it was excluded under s.24(2) of the 
Charter.  
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
DID YOU KNOW 
 
…that as of April, 2005 the 
RCMP was 22,561 strong, an 
increase of 322 over 2004.  
Personnel breakdown, including 













Circumstances and situations do colour life, but 
you have been given the mind to chose what the 
colour shall be—John Horner Smith 
 
                                                 
8 Source: http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/html/organi_e.htm [December 23, 2005] 
9 Source: http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/html/organi_e.htm [May 17, 2004] 
 
Position 2005 20049 Change 
Commissioner 1 1 0 
Deputy Commissioner 7 5 +2 
Assistant Commissione 24 24 0 
Chief Superintendent 52 56 -4 
Superintendents 143 135 +8 
Inspectors 346 331 +15 
Corps Sergeant Major 1 1 0 
Sergeant Major 6 7 -1 
Staff Sergeant Major 5 1 +4 
Staff Sergeants 742 704 +38 
Sergeants 1,616 1,568 +48 
Corporals 2,928 2,777 +151 
Constables 10,136 10,039 +97 
Other regular members n/a 4 -4 
Special Constables 82 n/a +82 
Civilian Members 2,605 2,585 +20 
Public Servants 3,867 4,001 -134 
Total 22,561 22,239 +322 
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GUNS & GROW OPERATORS 
DON’T GO TOGETHER 
R. v. Wiles, 2005 SCC 84 
 
The accused plead guilty to two 
charges of unlawfully producing 
cannabis. During the first 
offence police responded to a 
911 call accidentally placed by the accused’s 
daughter and discovered a 178 plant grow 
operation in the basement of the home. While 
out on bail for that offence, police seized about 
three pounds of marihuana, production apparatus 
including two scales and a large amount of cash, 
resulting in a second charge. In Nova Scotia 
Provincial Court the Crown sought the mandatory 
minimum 10 year firearms prohibition under 
s.109(1)(c) of the Criminal Code. Under this 
section a firearms ban is required for those who 
have been convicted of trafficking, possession 
for the purpose of trafficking, importing, or 
producing a scheduled substance. 
 
At trial a police officer testified there was a 
nexus between the firearms ban and growing 
marihuana.  His evidence was summarized by the 
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal as follows: 
 
[The officer] testified that in many police 
raids of drug production operations, it is usual 
to find weaponry, in particular, firearms, even 
in the case of simple marihuana grow 
operations.  Such weapons are kept by the 
operators, not necessarily to deal with police 
but, to protect the operation from others who 
would steal the product or proceeds.  These 
vary from a single .22 calibre rifle readily 
available by the front door of the operation to 
a virtual arsenal of firearms.  In some cases, 
the guns are rigged as mantraps.   It was his 
evidence that the presence of guns is driven 
by basic economics.  A mature marihuana plant 
is currently worth about five hundred dollars 
in product.  A grow operation with multiple 
plants can easily be valued in the thousands of 
dollars.  It is an investment worth protecting 
from the perspective of the operators.  The 
THC (tetrahydrocannabinol) level in marihuana 
is now sufficiently high that in certain areas it 
trades pound for pound with cocaine.  The 
concern about the presence of weapons is a 
significant one for officers involved in drug 
raids.  They approach every such raid 
expecting firearms. 10 
 
The trial judge, however, refused to prohibit the 
accused, finding s.109(1)(c) of the Criminal Code 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment under 
s.12 of the Charter. In his view, there was not 
necessarily a connection between the purpose of 
the mandatory prohibition and the offence of 
growing marihuana. Since there was no violence 
involved with the accused growing his marihuana, 
a firearms prohibition would be ‘grossly 
disproportionate’ to the offence11. He also 
concluded that the Charter violation could not be 
saved by s.1. The judge then read down the 
mandatory prohibition to a discretionary one and 
refused to make the prohibition order. 
 
The Crown appealed to the Nova Scotia Court of 
Appeal, which overturned the judge’s decision.  
Justice Bateman, authoring the unanimous appeal 
court judgment, found it was clear from the 
police officer’s evidence that the prohibition had 
a legitimate connection to a s. 7 Controlled Drugs 
and Substances Act (CDSA) offence.  
Furthermore, Justice Bateman was satisfied 
that the weapons ban related to a recognized 
sentencing goal—protection of the public, and, in 
particular, protection of police officers engaged 
in drug enforcement operations.  Moreover, the 
protection of public safety through a reduction 
in the misuse of firearms is a valid state 
interest. Additionally, Justice Bateman found 
the ameliorative effect of s. 113 of the Criminal 
Code, which allows a judge to consider 
unacceptable hardship and exercise some 
discretion in making a prohibition order, 
eliminates any unacceptable consequences of a 
firearms prohibition if it deprives a person of a 
livelihood or sustenance.   
 
The accused then brought a further appeal, this 
time to Canada’s highest court. The Supreme 
                                                 
10 see R. v. Wiles, 2004 NSCA 3, at para. 49 
11 see R. v. Wiles, 2004 NSCA 3 
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Court first examined the test of what 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under 
s.12 of the Charter. In determining whether a 
punishment is cruel or unusual it must be so 
excessive as to outrage standards of decency 
and the court must be satisfied if it is so grossly 
disproportionate that Canadians would find it 
abhorrent or intolerable. If the punishment is 
grossly disproportionate for the offender, then 
a s.1 Charter justifiability analysis will be 
undertaken.  If the punishment is not grossly 
disproportionate for the offender, then the 
court will consider whether or not the 
punishment is disproportionate for reasonable 
hypotheticals, but not far-fetched, marginally 
imaginable, remote, or extreme examples.  
 
The accused first argued that the mandatory 
prohibition does not distinguish between small 
and large grow operations. The hypothetical the 
accused presented was that of a 75 year old 
grandmother experimentally growing a single 
marihuana plant. If convicted under s.7 of the 
CDSA she would face the same weapons 
prohibition as a large commercial grower. 
Secondly, he submitted that there was no 
consideration on whether or not the underlying 
offence involved violence or the offender posed 
a risk to public safety.  
 
Justice Charron, writing the unanimous judgment 
for the nine member Supreme Court, agreed with 
the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal. In her view the 
accused did not establish that the imposition of 
a mandatory weapons prohibition order 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment.  The 
prohibition had a legitimate connection to 
production offences and related to a recognized 
sentencing goal—the protection of the public, 
including the protection of police officers 
engaged in the enforcement of drug offences.  
As well, the state interest in reducing the 
misuse of weapons was valid and important.  
Furthermore, “the sentencing judge gave 
insufficient weight to the fact that possession 
and use of firearms is not a right or freedom 
guaranteed under the Charter, but a privilege” 
said Justice Charron.  She continued: 
 
[Firearms possession] is also a heavily 
regulated activity, requiring potential gun-
owners to obtain a licence before they can 
legally purchase one…[R]equiring the licensing 
and registration of firearms was a valid 
exercise of the federal criminal law power.  If 
Parliament can legitimately impose restrictions 
on the possession of firearms by general 
legislation that applies to all, it follows that it 
can prohibit their possession upon conviction 
of certain criminal offences where it deems it 
in the public interest to do so.  It is sufficient 
that [the accused] falls within a category of 
offenders targeted for the risk that they may 
pose.  The sentencing judge’s insistence upon 
specific violence, actual or apprehended, in 
relation to the particular offence and the 
individual offender takes too narrow a view of 
the rationale underlying the mandatory 
weapons prohibition orders.  
  
Insofar as the individual offender is 
concerned, there is no evidence as to any 
effect that the prohibition orders will have on 
[the accused], apart from the loss of the 
firearms already in his possession.  Since he 
was legally in possession of the firearms, the 
sentencing judge inferred that he was a 
recreational hunter and shooter.  Even 
assuming that to be the case, the loss of this 
privilege would not support the sentencing 
judge’s finding of gross disproportionality.  As 
a twice convicted producer of a controlled 
substance, [the accused’s] loss of the privilege 
to possess firearms for recreational purposes 
falls far short of punishment “so excessive as 
to outrage our standards of decency”.  In 
addition, the mandatory provision does not 
have a grossly disproportionate effect having 
regard to any reasonable hypothetical.  Again 
here, I agree with the Court of Appeal that 
the sentencing judge did not properly weigh 
the ameliorative effect of s. 113 of the 
Criminal Code which permits the court to lift 
the order for sustenance or employment 
reasons….[para. 9-10] 
 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca 
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NO CHARTER ISSUES ARISE 
FROM ROUTINE BORDER 
POCKET SEARCH 
R. v. Hudson, 
(2005) Docket:C42765 (OntCA) 
 
The accused, in company two 
friends and his two-year-old 
child, was refused entry into 
the U.S. because he did not 
have his son’s birth certificate. Upon returning 
to Canada he was referred to a secondary 
inspection where he was taken to a private room 
and told to empty his pockets. Five counterfeit 
$50 bills were discovered and he was arrested 
and charged with possession of counterfeit 
currency.  
 
At trial in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice 
the judge excluded the evidence of the 
counterfeit bills under s.24(2) of the Charter, 
ruling the pocket search was an unreasonable 
search and seizure under s.8. In her view, the 
Customs officer conducted a warrantless search, 
which was prima facie unreasonable, without any 
cause to suspect illegal activity or possession of 
contraband.  
 
The Crown appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing the trial judge erred in her 
analysis. Justice LaForme, authoring the 
unanimous judgment, first examined border 
crossing jurisprudence. Some of the legal 
considerations include: 
 
• Searches that are reasonable at the border 
may be unreasonable under other 
circumstances. For example, the police may 
not arbitrarily stop and search a citizen 
walking down the street, but travellers can be 
stopped by officials crossing an international 
boundary to ensure they or the goods they 
carry are permitted entry. As well, the law 
relating to the reasonableness of searches in 
general may not necessarily be relevant to 
the reasonableness of border searches 
conducted by customs officers; 
 
• Travellers crossing an international boundary 
fully expect to be screened, typically involving 
the production of identification, travel 
documentation, and a search process; and 
 
• There are three distinct categories of border 
searches: 
 
1. routine questioning and procedures, which 
may involve a search of baggage or a pat or 
frisk of outer clothing; 
 
2. strip or skin searches conducted in 
private; and 
 
3. body cavity search involving medical 
doctors, X-rays, emetics, or other highly 
invasive means 
 
Moreover, the greater the intrusiveness of the 
search the greater the requisite justification 
and constitutional protection. 
 
Justice LaForme noted that the trial judge was 
in error when she found the pocket search 
rested between a category 1 and category 2 
search. Rather than finding the pocket search 
fell into one of the three discrete categories, 
she incorrectly placed it on a continuum. Justice 
LaForme stated: 
 
In this case…the search did not fall between 
categories one and two; rather, the search was 
clearly a category one search.  In the context 
of a border search, asking the [accused] to 
turn his pockets inside out was no more 
invasive than a search of baggage, or a purse, 
or a pat down or frisk of outer clothing.  At no 
time was the [accused] strip-searched or 
patted down.  Moreover, the border search in 
this case had only proceeded to a secondary 
inspection, which remains a routine part of the 
general screening process… 
 
I conclude, therefore, that the trial judge 
erred by failing to recognize that a pocket 
search is a non-invasive routine screening 
procedure within the legitimate purpose of 
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border crossings, which does not raise Charter 
issues…[para. 38-39] 
 
The Crown’s appeal was allowed and a new trial 
was ordered.  
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
2005 POLICE STATS UNVEILED 
 
Statistics Canada has 
recently released its 2005 
policing statistics12. In 2005, 
there were a total of 61,050 
police officers across Canada, up 1,250 from last 
year. Ontario had the most police officers with 
23,420 while the Yukon had the least at 120. 
 
Province/Territory 2005 2004 Change 
Ontario 23,420 23,214 +206 
Quebec 14,753 14,426 +327 
British Columbia 7,469 7,072 +397 
Alberta 5,335 5,123 +212 
Manitoba 2,256 2,266 -10 
Saskatchewan 2,011 2,010 +1 
Nova Scotia 1,624 1,615 +9 
New Brunswick 1,297 1,302 -5 
Newfoundland 776 766 +10 
Prince Edward Island 213 207 +6 
Northwest Territories 173 171 +2 
Nunavut 121 123 -2 
Yukon 120 121 -1 
RCMP HQ & Training 
Academy 
1,482 1,384 +98 
Total 61,050 59,800 +1,250 
 
Gender representation shifted 7% over the last 
decade with women accounting for nearly 10,600 
police officers (or 17%) in 2005. British 
Columbia had the highest percentage of female 
officers at 21.0%, followed by Quebec (18.9%), 
Nunavut (17.4%), and Saskatchewan (17.3%). 
Provinces and territories having a lower 
percentage of women than the national average 
were Ontario (16.6%), Alberta (15.8%), 
Newfoundland (14.3%), Yukon (14.2%), Manitoba 
(14.1%), Northwest Territories (13.9%), New 
Brunswick (13.6%), Nova Scotia (13.4%), and 
Prince Edward Island (12.7%).  
                                                 
12 Source http://www40.statcan.ca/101/cst01/legal105a.htm [accessed December 
26, 2005] 
ARREST NOT REQUIRED TO 
DIRECT & CONTROL 
R. v. Johnson, 2005 ABCA 347 
 
The accused was an intoxicated 
passenger in a vehicle driven by 
his wife that struck a 
pedestrian. He tried to comfort 
her even though the officer told him to stay 
away and had to be forcibly removed from the 
truck after he climbed in it to get a cell phone. 
The accused was convicted for obstruction in 
Alberta Provincial Court because (1) he entered 
the truck and tried to move its contents after 
being told not to touch the vehicle or anything 
inside and (2) he resisted the officer when being 
removed from the truck and refusing to leave 
afterwards. The accused appealed to the 
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench and the judge 
found the conviction based on entering the 
vehicle proper, but the resisting particulars did 
not have a sufficient basis.  
 
The accused sought leave to appeal before the 
Alberta Court of Appeal arguing the trial judge 
erred, in part, by finding that a person can be 
directed or controlled by a peace officer 
without an arrest being effected. In denying the 
application for leave to appeal, Justice Ritter 
stated, “[The accused] seeks leave to argue the 
following question: can a police officer stop an 
accused and direct and control him without 
effecting a lawful arrest? The Supreme Court 
decision in R. v. Mann…addresses the scope of 
detention and the authority of police officers to 
detain without arrest.” Leave to appeal was 
refused. 
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
All past editions of this 
newsletter are available online 
by clicking on the Police 
Academy link at:  
www.jibc.bc.ca 
 






R. v. Birmingham, 2005 BCPC 0489 
 
The police set up a roadblock at 
the only entrance to a beach 
park in response to a number of 
violent incidents occurring in 
the park. The stated aim was to 
“monitor Criminal Code, Motor Vehicle Act and 
Liquor Control Act violations or anything that 
might jeopardize public safety.” All vehicles 
were stopped, drivers were asked for licenses 
and insurance, and a cursory visual inspection was 
made of the vehicle interior for weapons or 
alcohol. In addition, vehicle occupants were 
asked about weapons and alcohol as well as the 
contents of bags or containers. The accused was 
stopped, identified, and found to be a prohibited 
driver.  
 
At the accused’s trial in British Columbia 
Provincial Court on a charge of driving while 
prohibited the roadblock supervisor testified 
the roadblock was used as a proactive approach 
to address acts of violence in the park. He also 
agreed there was no authority to detain vehicles 
in the roadblock except under the Motor Vehicle 
Act. 
 
Judge Baird Ellan ruled the roadblock 
unconstitutional. Since there was no reasonable 
cause to detain the accused the detention was 
arbitrary. However, unlike arbitrary stops 
related to highway safety, this detention could 
not be saved by s.1. The road block was set up 
primarily to monitor weapons and alcohol 
entering the park—monitoring driving offences 
was peripheral. After reviewing a number of 
cases the judge stated: 
 
The law appears to be clear that a roadblock 
set up for the sole or primary purpose of 
detecting crime is an arbitrary detention and 
not one authorized by law under Section 1 of 
the Charter of Rights.  While [the Crown] 
pointed to Section 33 of the Motor Vehicle 
Act requiring a driver to produce their 
driver's licence when requested to do so, that 
section does not itself provide authority for a 
stop of this nature, nor if it did, would that be 
an answer to the Section 1 issue.  The question 
would still be whether a police officer acting 
under the Motor Vehicle Act should be 
permitted or is permitted to conduct random 
stops of vehicles in order to prevent crime in a 
problem area in the absence of articulable 
cause or grounds to stop or, I should say, any 
indication of an ancillary power being satisfied 
in the particular case. 
 
The cases have extended the Section 1 
protection to police conducting vehicle stops in 
a limited set of circumstances and have 
consistently declined to extend that 
protection to broader uses than highway 
safety.  Again, in this case, I do not know 
whether those uses might extend beyond 
simple highway safety or that as a major aim.  
The aim here was not highway but park 
safety.  The officer agreed that foot patrols 
could have been used but that it was more 
expedient to conduct a roadblock. 
 
This was not a traffic road stop, it was a 
preventative policing initiative based upon 
complaints in the specific area but not specific 
articulable complaints on the night in question.  
That, however, did not raise it above a road 
stop.  There was clearly no articulable cause or 
anything by way of an immediate complaint 
that might engage the ancillary police power to 




Given the location, at the mouth of a parking 
lot, and the catalyst, recent complaints about 
violence and alcohol, it is difficult to 
understand how a traffic purpose might really 
be advanced.  Whether motor vehicle 
infractions in the parking lot might be a 
peripheral purpose of the stop, it was not a 
purpose sufficient to legitimize the primary 
one, in my view. 
 
This was not a situation where persons 
committing crimes were caught incidentally in 
a road stop for traffic safety purposes.  It 
 34            www.jibc.bc.ca Volume 6 Issue 1 
  January/February 2006 
was aimed at catching persons who might 
disturb the peace in the park.  That might be a 
justifiable purpose for a stop but the Crown 
did not establish that in this case through any 
evidence 
 
Aside from the officer's assertion that there 
had been recent complaints, there was no 
evidence to show that the area was a specific 
problem and that this kind of initiative was 
necessary to enforce the law.  So I do find 
that there was a breach with respect to the 
arbitrary detention, that there was no 
established justification pursuant to Section 
1. [paras. 26-28] 
 
In excluding the evidence of the accused’s 
identity under s.24(2), Judge Baird Ellan held: 
 
…The admission of the evidence would endorse 
the technique employed here, ignore the 
breach of the rights of this accused and all 
others who passed through the stop on that 
occasion and could provide incentive to employ 
such techniques in the future on the chance 
that the results might be admissible in court. 
[para. 40] 
 
It should be noted that Judge Baird Ellan found 
the Crown did not present a s.1 justification, but 
rather let the case fall or stand on the Motor 
Vehicle Act authority. She did not rule out the 
Crown presenting a s.1 Charter justification in a 
future case, either through legislation or an 
ancillary police power. The charge was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
SUPREME COURT DEFINES 
YOUTH ‘VIOLENT OFFENCE’ 
R. v. C.D. & R. v. C.D.K., 2005 SCC 78 
 
In two consolidated cases 
arising from Alberta the 
Supreme Court of Canada has 
ruled on the interpretation of 
the definition “violent offence” as it was found in 
s.39(1)(a) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act 
(YCJA). Section 39(1)(a) of the YCJA prohibits a 
young person being sentenced to custody unless, 
among other things, they committed a “violent 
offence.”  
 
In R. v. C.D., the young person plead guilty to the 
Criminal Code offences of possessing a weapon 
dangerous to the public peace, arson, and breach 
of recognizance. The sentencing judge ruled that 
violence to property (vehicle arson) was a violent 
offence and sentenced C.D. to six months of 
deferred custody followed by probation.  
 
C.D. appealed to the Alberta Court of Appeal 
arguing, among other grounds, that the 
sentencing judge erred in concluding the 
property offence of arson where there was no 
actual or attempted bodily harm was a “violent 
offence.” The Alberta Court of Appeal dismissed 
C.D.’s appeal finding an offence was violent for 
the purposes of the YCJA if it “causes bodily 
harm, is intended to cause bodily harm, or if it is 
reasonably foreseeable that the action may 
cause bodily harm.” Although the vehicle was set 
on fire late at night on a deserted street, the 
court noted that accelerants were used and 
there was a “risk to anyone who happened to use 
the street that night and anyone charged with 
controlling the fire” (ie. firefighters).  
 
In R. v. C.D.K., the young person plead guilty to 
the Criminal Code offences of dangerous driving, 
possession of stolen property, and theft. The 
sentencing judge found the dangerous driving 
offence involving a high speed police chase was a 
“violent offence” because there was potential 
for serious damage and injury. C.D.K. was 
sentenced to six months of deferred custody 
followed by probation. 
 
C.D.K. also appealed to the Alberta Court of 
Appeal similarly arguing, in part, that the 
offence was not violent. C.D.K.’s appeal was also 
dismissed, the court holding that “if it is 
reasonably foreseeable that criminal conduct 
may result in bodily harm that is more than 
merely trifling or transitory, the offence is 
violent.” Since high speed chases are dangerous 
and can easily result in serious injury or death, 
the sentencing judge did not err. 




Both youths then appealed to the Supreme Court 
of Canada where the court was tasked with 
defining the term “violent offence” found in 
s.39(1)(a) of the YCJA. Since the term was not 
defined in the legislation, the court used the 
rules of statutory interpretation having regard 
to grammatical and ordinary sense of the words, 
the object and scheme of the Act, and 
Parliament’s intent.  
 
After reviewing two approaches, a force based 
definition (where force is exerted) and a harm 
based definition (where harm is suffered), the 
eight member majority chose the harm based 
meaning. The definition of “violent offence” 
enunciated by Justice Bastarache, authoring the 
majority opinion, was: 
 
An offence in the commission of which a young 
person causes, attempts to cause or threatens 
to cause bodily harm.  
 
A meaning capturing offences where bodily harm 
is intended or reasonably foreseeable was 
rejected. First, the court noted that something 
more than a guilty mind (intent) is required 
before punishment is imposed. Second, 
encapsulating a definition that includes offences 
where bodily harm is reasonably foreseeable is 
too broad and would incorporate most Criminal 
Code offences, thereby increasing the number of 
offences open to custodial sentences. A 
narrower interpretation is preferred and 
something more than merely committing the 
offence is required.  
 
As well, there is distinction between an offence 
being violent and one that is dangerous (likely to 
result in bodily harm). Since the Criminal Code 
treats these types of offences differently, 
Justice Bastarache opined that the YCJA should 
also treat them differently.  As a result, neither 
the vehicle arson nor the police pursuit was a 
violent offence. The appeals were allowed, the 
custodial sentences quashed, and the matters 
were remitted back to the sentencing judges for 
an appropriate sentence. 
 
Justice Lebel agreed with the majority’s 
disposition of the appeal. However, rather than 
adopting a harm based approach that focuses on 
the outcome of the crime, he suggested a fault 
based definition that focuses on the offences 
nature and/or underlying intent of the youth. 
Using the fault-based approach a violent offence 
would be defined as “an offence whereby the 
offender intends, threatens or attempts to 
cause harm.”  
 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca 
 
SEAT BELT DEFENCE 
REJECTED: OFFICER WINS 
LAWSUIT 
Iachetta v. Ioannone, 2005 BCSC 566 
 
The plaintiff, a police officer, 
was a passenger in a police car 
that tried to pin a stolen vehicle 
in from the rear after a police 
chase. The defendant (driver of 
the stolen vehicle) reversed rapidly and crashed 
into the police car. The police driver was wearing 
his seatbelt, but the passenger officer was not, 
and the airbags deployed. The passenger officer 
was injured and sued the driver of the stolen car 
for damages.  
 
At trial in British Columbia Supreme Court the 
defendant argued that the driver of the police 
car should have been partially liable for the 
damages because he did not exercise appropriate 
caution—he should have anticipated the potential 
accident and not stopped so close to the stolen 
vehicle. In rejecting this submission and holding 
the defendant fully liable for the accident, 
Justice Williamson stated: 
 
I do not find that submission persuasive.  We 
have to see this in the context of a police 
pursuit.  We have to see this in the context 
of the statutory obligation upon a police 
officer in these circumstances, not only to 
effect an arrest of a person who is driving 
what is believed to be a stolen vehicle, but 
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given the behaviour of that driver, to do 
everything they could to make sure that that 
car did not go anywhere in a circumstance 
that was replete with danger. 
 
It is the members of the public that I am 
concerned about here.  This was a case where 
a person fleeing the police had driven his car 
up on a sidewalk at a busy intersection at 
8:30 in the morning.  I can find absolutely no 
fault whatsoever with the action of [the 
officer] in manoeuvring his car as he did on 
that morning. [paras. 20-21] 
 
The defendant also argued for a reduction in 
non-pecuniary damages because the officer was 
not wearing his seatbelt.  In addition to proving 
the officer had no seatbelt on, the defendant 
would also need to prove that not wearing it was 
negligent and if he had worn it, the injuries 
would have been less serious. In assessing 
whether the officer was negligent in not wearing 
his seatbelt, Justice Williamson first examined 
the Motor Vehicle Act regulations exempting an 
officer from wearing a seatbelt during the 
course of their duties. Section 32.04(4) of the 
regulations states: 
 
When a peace officer has reasonable and 
probable grounds to believe the use of a seat 
belt assembly would obstruct the 
performance of his duties, the peace officer 
and any passenger is exempt... 
 
In holding that the damages should not be 
reduced for contributory negligence because the 
plaintiff was not wearing his seatbelt, Justice 
Williamson stated:  
 
With respect to this case, I agree with the 
defence that the plaintiff had time to put the 
seat belt on.  That wasn't the concern.  
Indeed, [the officer], who was driving this 
car, had put his seat belt on.  But important in 
this case is the testimony from the police 
officers about general police procedures, the 
different role of the driver and the 
passenger, that is to say the other police 
officer in the car doing a pursuit.  The driver 
concentrates on driving.  The passenger is the 
one who does the radio broadcasting and uses 
the computer, and, when he is able to, assists 
the driver in observations of potential 
dangers.  But more important than that, when 
the chase ends, it is the passenger who has 
the duty to make first contact with the 
suspect, and it is the driver who is to be the 
cover officer, which is in accord with common 
sense.  The driver is driving a car in difficult 
circumstances, and the first thing he should 
do is secure that car in a stopped position 
before he starts jumping out of the car. 
So I have no doubt in accepting the evidence 
of the officers that that is the practice.  It 
seems to me to be a most salutary one. 
 
The evidence of the plaintiff was the 
difficulty is that if one puts on one's seat 
belt there is an interference with the 
equipment belt that the police officers wear, 
which includes, of course, a radio; in some 
circumstances a baton;  -- we have seen them 
in court many times and we have seen them on 
the street many times, I can say -- a sidearm 
and so forth.  It was the evidence of the 
plaintiff that in that circumstance one does 
not know what is going to happen -- indeed, 
that was evident in this case.  No one 
expected, no one in the police car expected 
to happen what did happen.  Whenever a 
pursuit comes to a halt, and it may be a 
sudden halt, the passenger police officer has 
to leap from the car with dispatch, with 
alacrity, and he says there will be delay in 
exiting the car if that belt gets caught up in 




I go back to the Motor Vehicle Act 
regulation.  I conclude that the plaintiff's not 
using a seat belt in this particular 
circumstance manifests a reasonable belief on 
his part that the use of the seat belt would 
obstruct the performance of his duties.  I 
ask myself, what if the person in that car had 
drawn a gun on a crowded street with citizens 
coming out of Starbucks coffee shop or 
walking down the sidewalk?  A split second 
while the officer disentangled himself from a 
tangled seat belt could have been fatal.  I 
think it was reasonable and is reasonable in 
those sorts of circumstances, for a police 
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officer to rely upon the exemption that is 
permitted him in the seat belt regulations, 
and not do up his seat belt. [para. 62] 
 
Furthermore, the judge added, there was no 
evidence the injuries would have been worse if 
the officer had been wearing his seatbelt, given 
the deployment of the air bag. The “seatbelt 
defence” was rejected and the officer was 
awarded $17,500 for injuries suffered from the 
defendant’s reckless, malicious, and outrageous 
conduct.  
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
 ‘IN SERVICE’ LEGAL ROAD 
TEST ANSWERS 
 
1. (b) a privilege—see R. v. Wiles (at p.29 of 
this publication). Justice Charron stated, 
“possession and use of firearms is not a right 
or freedom guaranteed under the Charter, 
but a privilege.” 
 
2. (a) true—see R. v. Munro (at p. 20 of this 
publication). Justice Low stated, “there is no 
requirement in law that a search warrant be 
obtained if the search is conducted 
incidentally to the lawful arrest of the 
suspect for any of three reasons:  to ensure 
the safety of the police and the public; to 
protect evidence from destruction or…for 
‘the discovery of evidence which can be used 
at the arrestee’s trial’.” 
 
3. (a) true—see R. v. Arsenault (at p. 23 of this 
publication). Justice Deschenes stated, “the 
demand under s. 254(2) was unauthorized 
and unlawful…because the device…used to 
collect the fail result, was not proved to be 
an approved screening device.” 
 
4. (b) false—see R. v. Spitale, (at p. 25 of this 
publication). Justice Routhwaite stated, 
“During investigative detention officers may 
conduct a protective pat-down search of the 
detainee where they believe on reasonable 
grounds that their safety or the safety of 
others is at risk”.  See also R. v. Mann, where 
Supreme Court of Canada Justice Iacobucci 
wrote, “The general duty of officers to 
protect life may, in some circumstances, give 
rise to the power to conduct a pat-down 
search incident to an investigative detention. 
Such a search power does not exist as a 
matter of course; the officer must believe 
on reasonable grounds that his or her own 
safety, or the safety of others, is at risk. I 
disagree with the suggestion that the power 
to detain for investigative searches endorses 
an incidental search in all circumstances.” 
 
5. (a) true—see R. v. Hudson (at p. 31 of this 
publication). Justice LaForme stated, “a 
pocket search is a non-invasive routine 
screening procedure within the legitimate 
purpose of border crossings, which does not 




Here is a sneak peek at some of 
the appeals to be heard before 
the Supreme Court of Canada in 
2006 that will be important to 
law enforcement.  
 
R. v. Shoker (see Volume 5 Issue 1 for a case 
summary of the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
decision) Scheduled to be heard on February 14, 
2006. Issue: constitutionality of a probation 
condition requiring a person submit to a breath 
test on demand of a peace officer. 
 
R. v. Chaisson (see Volume 5 Issue 5 for a case 
summary of the Newfoundland Court of Appeal 
decision) Scheduled to be heard on March 15, 
2006. Issue: investigative detention and 
evidence admissibility. 
 
R. v. Clayton (see Volume 5 Issue 2 for a case 
summary of the Ontario Court of Appeal 
decision) Scheduled to be heard on May 18, 
2006. Issue: constitutionality of a police 
roadblock used is response to a gun call.  
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Voyeur—one obtaining
sexual gratification from
seeing sex organs and
sexual acts; broadly : one
who habitually seeks sexual
stimulation by visual means.
(source: Merriam Webster Online
Dictionary www.m-w.com) 
GOVERNMENT TOUGHENS 
CHILD SEX LAWS 
 
Canada’s federal lawmakers 
have created a new voyeurism 
provision in the Criminal Code 
through Bill C-2 and have 
increased maximum sentences 
and added minimum penalties 





Under Canada’s new voyeurism law, a hybrid 
offence carrying a maximum sentence of five 
years in prison by indictment was added to the 
formerly repealed s.162 of the Criminal Code. 
The new section reads: 
 
A "visual recording" is 
defined as including “a 
photographic, film or 
video recording made by 
any means.” However, 
paragraphs (a) or (b) are 
not offences if the 
person carrying out the activity is a peace 
officer acting under the authority of a general 
warrant issued pursuant to s.487.01 of the 
Criminal Code.   
 
Anyone who prints or has in their possession 
voyeuristic recordings for the purpose of 
printing also commits an offence: 
       
Section 162(6) creates a defence for a 
voyeurism charge “if the acts that are alleged to 
constitute the offence serve the public good and 
do not extend beyond what serves the public 
good.” Section 162(7), however, states that “the 
motives of an accused are irrelevant” and “it is a 
question of law whether an act serves the public 
good and whether there is evidence that the act 
alleged goes beyond what serves the public good, 
but it is a question of fact whether the act does 
or does not extend beyond what serves the 
public good.”  
 
Child Sex Crimes 
 
Several of the child sex crime sections in the 
Criminal Code have had the maximum penalties 
increased and minimum penalties added (see 
Child Sex and Other Offence Sentencing Grid on 
p.39).  One ancillary consequence of adding a 
minimum punishment to an offence is that a 
conditional sentence under s.742.1 of the 
Criminal Code cannot be imposed.  
s.162 (1) Criminal Code 
Every one commits an offence who, surreptitiously,
observes—including by mechanical or electronic
means—or makes a visual recording of a person who
is in circumstances that give rise to a reasonable
expectation of privacy, if  
(a) the person is in a place in which a person can
reasonably be expected to be nude, to expose
his or her genital organs or anal region or her
breasts, or to be engaged in explicit sexual
activity; 
(b) the person is nude, is exposing his or her
genital organs or anal region or her breasts, or
is engaged in explicit sexual activity, and the
observation or recording is done for the
purpose of observing or recording a person in
such a state or engaged in such an activity; or 
(c) the observation or recording is done for a
sexual purpose.  
s.162 (4) Criminal Code 
Every one commits an offence who, knowing that a
recording was obtained by the commission of an
offence under subsection (1), prints, copies,
publishes, distributes, circulates, sells, advertises
or makes available the recording, or has the
recording in his or her possession for the purpose
of printing, copying, publishing, distributing,
circulating, selling or advertising it or making it
available.  
A “conditional sentence is a meaningful alternative to
incarceration for less serious and non-dangerous
offenders…who…will serve a sentence under strict
surveillance in the community instead of going to prison [and
whose] liberty will be constrained by conditions to be
attached to the sentence… .” R. v. Proulx, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61
(S.C.C.) 







On child pornography … 
[N]o one denies that child 
pornography involves the 
exploitation of children. The 
links between possession of 
child pornography and harm to 
children are arguably more 
attenuated than are the links 
between the manufacture and 
distribution of child 
pornography and harm to 
children. However, possession 
of child pornography 
contributes to the market for 
child pornography, a market 
which in turn drives 
production involving the 
exploitation of children. 
Possession of child 
pornography may facilitate 
the seduction and grooming of 
victims and may break down 





Because of their physical, 
mental, and emotional 
immaturity, children are one 
of the most vulnerable groups 
in society, particularly with 
regard to sexual violence. 
Child pornography plays a role 
in the abuse of children, 
exploiting the extreme 
vulnerability of children. 
Pornography that depicts real 
children is particularly 
noxious because it creates a 






                                                 
13 R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45 at para. 28 (for the majority) 
14 R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45 at para. 169  
Child Sex and Other Offence Sentencing Grid 
Offence Mode Old New 
  Punishment Punishment 
Indictable Max. 10 yrs Max. 10 yrs 
Min. 45 days 
 
Sexual interference 
s. 151 Cr. C. Summary Max. 6 mos Max. 18 mos 
Min. 14 days 
Indictable Max. 10 yrs Max. 10 yrs 
Min. 45 days 
 
Invitation to sexual touching 
s.152 Cr. C. Summary Max. 6 mos Max. 18 mos 
Min. 14 days 
Indictable Max. 5 yrs Max. 10 yrs 
Min. 45 days 
 
Sexual exploitation 
s.153 Cr. C. Summary Max. 6 mos Max. 18 mos 
Min. 14 days 
Indictable Max. 10 yrs Max. 10 yrs 
Min. 1 yr 
 
Making child pornography  
s.163.1(2) Cr. C. Summary Max. 6 mos Max. 18 mos 
Min. 90 days 
Indictable Max. 10 yrs Max. 10 yrs 
Min. 1 yr 
 
Distributing child pornography 
s.163.1(3) Cr. C. Summary Max. 6 mos Max. 18 mos 
Min. 90 days 
Indictable Max. 5 yrs Max. 5 yrs 
Min. 45 days 
 
Possessing child pornography 
s.163.1(4) Cr. C. Summary Max. 6 mos Max. 18 mos 
Min. 14 days 
Indictable Max. 5 yrs Max. 5 yrs 
Min. 45 days 
 
Accessing child pornography 
s.163.1(4.1) Cr. C. Summary Max. 6 mos Max. 18 mos 
Min. 14 days 
Indictable 
(if<14 yrs) 
Max. 5 yrs 
 
Max. 5 yrs 
Min. 6 mos 
 
Parent procuring sexual activity 
s.170 Cr. C. Indictable 
(if 14-17 yrs) 
Max. 2 yrs 
 
Max. 2 yrs 
Min. 45 days 
Indictable 
(if<14 yrs) 
Max. 5 yrs 
 
Max. 5 yrs 
Min. 6 mos 
 
Householder permit sexual activity 
s.171 Cr. C. Indictable 
(if 14-17 yrs) 
Max. 2 yrs 
 
Max. 2 yrs 
Min. 45 days 
Living off avails prostitute < 18 yrs 
s.212(2) Cr. C. 
Indictable Max. 14 yrs Max. 14 yrs 
Min. 2 yrs 
Prostitution with person < 18 yrs 
s.212(4) Cr. C. 
Indictable Max. 5 yrs Max. 5 yrs 
Min. 6 mos 
Indictable Max. 2 yrs Max. 5 yrs Duty to provide necessities 
s.215(3) Cr. C. Summary Max. 6 mos Max. 18 mos 
Indictable Max 2 yrs Max. 5 yrs Abandoning child 
s.218 Cr. C. Summary n/a Max. 18 mos 
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2006 POLICE LEADERSHIP 
CONFERENCE  
APRIL 10-12, 2006 
Coming soon!!! The British 
Columbia Association of Chief's 
of Police, the Ministry of Public 
Safety and Solicitor General 
and the Justice Institute of 
British Columbia will be hosting 
the "Police Leadership 2006 Conference" April 
10 to 12, 2006 at the Westin Bayshore in 
Vancouver, British Columbia. This is Canada’s 
largest Police Leadership Conference and was 
sold out in 2004 with more than 600 delegates 
attending.  
 
Leadership in policing is not bound by position or 
rank and this conference will provide delegates 
from the police community with an opportunity to 
explore a variety of leadership areas. Police 
Leadership 2006 will bring together experts who 
will provide current, lively, and interesting topics 
on leadership. This carefully chosen list of 
speakers will provide a first class opportunity at 
a first class venue to hear some of the world’s 
outstanding authorities on leadership. 
Therefore, early registration is encouraged so 
you do not miss out on this great opportunity. 
 
Beautiful downtown Vancouver will provide the 
backdrop for the Police Leadership 2006 
Conference. The host hotel, the Westin 
Bayshore Resort and Marina, offers state of the 
art facilities, excellent accommodation rates, 
and promises to be an enjoyable venue for the 
conference. The Westin is located on the shores 
of Coal Harbour, overlooking Stanley Park, and is 




Or you may choose to jog, bike, or roller blade 
along Vancouver’s famous Seawall. 
 
 
To date, Police Leadership 2006 has confirmed 
the following presenters: 
 
Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire 
O.C., C.M.M., M.S.C., C.D. (Retired) 
 
Stephen Covey  
Author, The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People 
 
Richard Boyatzis 
Author, Primal Leadership 
 
Rick Dinse  
Chief of Police, Salt Lake City Police Department  
 
John King  
Assistant Chief of Police, Montgomery County 
Department of Police 
 
Eddie Compass 





The registration fee for the Police Leadership 
2006 Conference is $385 CDN (plus GST) if you 
register before March 5, 2006. The conference 
fee for registrations received AFTER March 5, 
2006 will be $425 CDN (plus GST). The 
registration cut off date is April 5, 2006.  
 
The conference fee includes a reception on 
Monday evening, lunches on Tuesday and 
Wednesday, and a banquet dinner on Tuesday. 
Each participant will receive a "welcome package" 
upon registration. Register early, as the number 
of delegates is limited and past conferences 
have sold out prior to the registration cut-off 
date.  
 
Conference attire is business casual. 
 
For more information visit 
www.policeleadership.org
 
